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ABSTRACT 
 
The administrative norm of transparency, which promises a solution to the 
problem of government secrecy, requires political advocacy organized from outside 
the state. The traditional approach, typically the result of organized campaigns to 
make the state visible to the public, has been to enact freedom of information laws 
(FOI) that require government disclosure and grant enforceable rights to the public. 
The legal solution has not proven wholly satisfactory, however. In the past two 
decades, numerous advocacy movements have offered different fixes to the 
information asymmetry problem that the administrative state creates. These 
alternatives now augment and sometimes compete with legal transparency regimes. 
This article surveys and analyzes transparency advocacy campaigns and the “fix” 
that each proposes to the problems created by the state’s asymmetrical information 
advantage over the public. It sketches the history of four campaigns: the FOI 
movement in the United States, the global anti-corruption movement (spearheaded 
by Transparency International), the digital-transparency movement, and the advent 
of WikiLeaks. 
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The article offers two insights: First, although these movements share a basic 
set of assumptions and tell a similar policy story—secrecy is a pressing 
administrative problem that can be fixed with the right policies and institutional 
arrangements—they diverge significantly in how they understand not only the 
problem’s causes but the state itself. Second, the article unveils transparency as a 
contested political issue that masquerades as an administrative tool. Rooted in 
contestable claims about the state’s legitimacy and performance, the transparency 
fix leads to tendentious prescriptions about law, policy, and the state. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY PROBLEM 
Government transparency does not spring naturally from the modern 
democratic state. As Max Weber maintained, “[b]ureaucratic administration always 
tends to exclude the public, to hide its knowledge and action from criticism as well 
as it can.”1 The prerogative to create and maintain information asymmetries is one 
that government entities and officials do not easily surrender.2 Open government 
laws, which create legally enforceable rules requiring government entities to make 
information available, are thus largely the consequence of concentrated political 
activism and advocacy. For more than five decades, a broad transparency advocacy 
movement, composed of a diverse array of organizations operating from the 
transnational to local level, has attempted to address and mitigate the fundamental 
democratic and administrative problems that information asymmetry creates for 
legitimate and effective governance.3 
At its inception, the movement understood and defined excessive state 
secrecy as a problem caused by a scarcity of laws—one that could be solved by a 
powerful, wide-ranging, and publicly enforceable legal right to government 
information. The quintessential campaign, which had historical antecedents and 
contemporaries in the United States and elsewhere,4 was the mid-twentieth century 
effort in the United States that resulted in enactment of the federal Freedom of 
                                                           
 
1 3 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 992 (Guenther 
Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968). 
2 See id. at 992–93 (identifying the bureaucracy’s “pure power interest” in protecting its secrets from the 
legislature, something it will defend “fanatically”). 
3 For a summary of the claims made about secrecy’s costs to legitimate and effective governance, see 
Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 895–902 (2006). 
4 The most important domestic predecessor is discussed infra Part I-A. If one views transparency 
advocacy as a subset of more general campaigns for good government, then it dates back at least to the 
Progressive Era, when a social and political movement led the charge for reforms to eradicate 
bureaucratic corruption, especially at the municipal level. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR 
ORDER: 1877-1920, at 164–85 (1967). Indeed, Louis Brandeis’ famous claim that sunlight is “the best of 
disinfectants,” made as part of his campaign as a progressive trustbuster, dates from this period. LOUIS 
D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (Augustus M. Kelley 
Publishers 1986) (1914). With respect to international precedents, Anders Chydenius, a priest and 
legislator, led Sweden to adopt the first freedom of information law in 1766. See Juha Manninen, Anders 
Chydenius and the Origins of World’s First Freedom of Information Act, in THE WORLD’S FIRST 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: ANDERS CHYDENIUS’ LEGACY TODAY 18 (Juha Mustonen ed., 2006). 
But the Swedish law was limited to the press and did not establish a public right to information; nor did 
it augur a significantly more open domestic state or inspire imitation in the manner of the U.S. FOIA. 
See Leena Luhtanen, Transparency at the Core of Democracy, in THE WORLD’S FIRST FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT: ANDERS CHYDENIUS’ LEGACY TODAY, supra, at 56; Manninen, supra, at 52–53. 
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Information Act in 1966.5 That campaign has never ended. Numerous 
contemporary domestic and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
endeavor to preserve, strengthen, and extend open government mandates.6 
But the results of the freedom of information (FOI) campaign’s labors, while 
considerable, have not fully solved the problem that it sought to address, at least for 
the many advocates in the U.S. and around the world who regularly complain about 
the laws’ limited scope and their inadequate enforcement.7 In recent decades, 
several new networks and groups have responded to these frustrations by 
advocating alternative means to open the state to public view. Law, their efforts 
imply, is not the answer to secrecy, or at least not the only solution. 
I discuss three such campaigns in this article. The anti-corruption movement, 
exemplified by the NGO Transparency International, views transnational and 
domestic activism—which includes both lobbying for freedom of information laws 
and gathering and distributing information about governmental performance—as 
essential weapons in the larger battle to identify and stigmatize venal states and 
unscrupulous officials.8 This movement insists that transnational NGOs can use the 
                                                           
 
5 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (FOIA). 
6 Organizations that campaign on behalf of freedom-of-information laws include 
OpenTheGovernment.org, a coalition of organizations devoted to “stimulating legislative and executive 
branch action and garnering media attention to the benefits of government openness,” We Do, 
OPENTHEGOVERNMENT.ORG, http://www.openthegovernment.org/we_do (last visited July 7, 2012 ), the 
National Freedom of Information Coalition, which “protects our right to open government,” especially 
at the state level, About NFOIC, NAT’L FREEDOM OF INFO. COALITION, http://www.nfoic.org/about-
nfoic (last visited July 7, 2011), and OMB Watch, which “exists to increase government transparency 
and accountability; to ensure sound, equitable regulatory and budgetary processes and policies; and to 
protect and promote active citizen participation in our democracy,” About Us, OMB WATCH (July 28, 
2011), http://www.ombwatch.org/about_us. Internationally, the human rights organization Article 19 
defends and promotes freedom of expression and freedom of information all over the world and 
especially promotes “international human rights standards and . . . legislation that protects the right to 
speak and right to know in countries emerging from conflict, war and genocide or repression.” Who We 
Are, ARTICLE 19, http://www.article19.org/pages/en/who-we-are.html (last visited July 7, 2012). The 
website freedominfo.org, which is funded by several foundations and works with the National Security 
Archive in the U.S., serves as a “virtual network” for the many national FOI movements that have 
emerged in the last few decades, and provides “crucial information on freedom of information laws and 
how they were drafted and implemented, including how various provisions have worked in practice.” 
About Us, FREEDOMINFO.ORG, http://www.freedominfo.org/about-us/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). For 
general descriptions of the international FOI advocacy movement, see ALASDAIR ROBERTS, BLACKED 
OUT: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 107–11 (2006); John M. Ackerman & Irma E. 
Sandoval-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion of Freedom of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 
121–23 (2006). 
7 See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra Part II. 
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information they obtain from and about the state to lobby, pressure, and shame 
government into operating more accountably.9 Second, the “digital transparency” 
movement champions the use of information technology and networked 
communication as the solution to government secrecy, as well as a medium that can 
create a more participatory, collaborative state.10 For its advocates, technology will 
open the state by freeing its data.11 Third, WikiLeaks claims that its technological 
ability to distribute liberated (or stolen) government documents over the Internet 
will usher in a newly transparent state.12 This organization views itself as enforcing 
the public’s natural and internationally recognized human right to government 
information through extralegal means, assisted by arguably illegal acts—and often 
ones that are clearly illegal.13 These four campaigns—FOI, anti-corruption, digital 
transparency, and WikiLeaks—share a commitment to the nearly religious, 
normative concept of transparency around which they are organized,14 while each 
focuses on different issues and offers a distinct set of policy prescriptions. 
“Transparency” is a goal, a happy ending that inspires very different policy stories. 
This article probes the continuities and discontinuities among these 
movements and in the stories they tell.15 My purpose is two-fold. First, I explain 
that each of these movements operates privately—that is, as an activist advocating 
from outside of the state16—in search of a means to fix what it views as a 
                                                           
 
9 Id. 
10 See infra Part III. 
11 Id. 
12 See infra Part IV. 
13 Id. 
14 See Christopher Hood, Transparency in Historical Perspective, in TRANSPARENCY: THE KEY TO 
BETTER GOVERNANCE? 3, 3–5 (Christopher Hood & David Heald eds., 2006) (noting the abstract nature 
of transparency as a concept, as well as its “quasi-religious significance” and its ongoing evolution). 
15 There can be no doubt about transparency’s ascendance as a concept among academic advocates, 
especially in the economic and legal academic literature. See Emiliano Grossman et al., Economies 
Through Transparency, in TRANSPARENCY IN A NEW GLOBAL ORDER: UNVEILING ORGANIZATIONAL 
VISIONS 97, 100–01 (Christina Garsten & Monica Lindh de Montoya eds., 2008) (displaying a chart that 
shows an extraordinary rise in use of the term in journals within the EconLit database between 1986 and 
2004, and especially between 1997–2004); Guy I. Seidman, Lawyers are from Mars, Political Scientists 
are from Venus: Who Gets Transparency Right? (Mar. 21, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (finding in search of law review publications between 1990 and 2010 a nearly forty-fold 
increase in the use of the term “transparency” and a nearly three-fold increase in the use of the term 
“freedom of information”). 
16 They are all led by NGOs and funded by a mix of civic-minded interest groups, charitable 
foundations, and like-minded individuals. Among the leading foundations that support work on 
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fundamental and pervasive problem endemic to government. They share 
assumptions about the needs and rights of democratic citizens to have access to 
government information in order to mitigate—or, better, eradicate—the asymmetric 
informational advantage the state enjoys over its public. But they diverge 
significantly in how they understand not only the problem’s causes but also the 
state itself. In extolling the virtues of its own particular fix, each campaign offers a 
broader vision of transparency’s mission, one tied to its particular understanding of 
the current state and of the better state that it hopes will emerge under the 
administrative conditions that its work will surely help create. The transparency 
fix—an idea that occupies a pivotal position in contemporary debates about 
governance, administration, and regulation—thus reveals our political and social 
anxieties about administration and about how we understand and attempt to correct 
the shortcomings of administrative law. 
Second, the article unveils transparency as a contested political issue that 
masquerades as an administrative tool. The existing literature advocating and 
developing transparency as a concept has failed to map out transparency as a 
diverse and contested political field; instead, it has assumed transparency’s status 
                                                                                                                                      
 
transparency are the Open Society Foundations, which sponsor a “Transparency and Integrity Fund” to 
increase access to information at the U.S. state and federal levels and provide support for individual 
projects throughout the world. See About the Transparency and Integrity Fund, OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., 
http://www.soros.org /about (last visited July 7, 2012) (announcing availability of funding “for a wide 
range of policy advocacy strategies” relating to transparency); Fiscal Decentralization Initiative, LOC. 
GOV’T & PUB. SERVICE REFORM INITIATIVE, http://lgi.osi.hu/documents.php?m_id=191 (Feb. 18, 2009) 
(subsidiary of Open Society Institute); Rising Voices Launches Technology for Transparency Network, 
OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., http://www.soros.org/initiatives/information/focus/communication/news/ 
transparency-tools-20100119 (Jan. 19, 2010) (announcing a program co-created by Open Society 
Foundations grantee to promote the “use of technology for transparency and accountability” throughout 
Latin America, Asia, and Africa, among other places). Other foundations that have funded or established 
transparency-related projects include the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Ford Foundation. 
See Carnegie Results: Spring 2010, CARNEGIE CORP. OF N.Y., http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/ 
Publications/carnegie_results_spring_10_final_02.pdf (Spring 2010) (highlighting Carnegie’s support 
for the Project on Government Oversight, a “nonprofit organization that works with whistle-blowers to 
add transparency to government operations”); Democratic and Accountable Government: Promoting 
Transparent, Effective and Accountable Government, FORD FOUND., http://www.fordfoundation.org/ 
issues/democratic-and-accountable-government/promoting-transparent-effective-and-accountable-
government (last visited July 7, 2012) (announcing support for “community-driven efforts to improve 
the transparency and integrity of government institutions and processes”). Indeed, the problems that 
WikiLeaks has faced in receiving private donations—beginning in late 2010, major credit card 
companies, payment processors, and the owners of other payment systems stopped enabling individuals 
to send money to WikiLeaks—illustrate the extent to which NGOs must rely upon fundraising from 
private sources. On WikiLeaks’s financial struggles, see Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: 
WikiLeaks and the Battle Over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
311, 341–43 (2011). 
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as a universal norm and debated the technical and legal issues of optimal 
administration and application.17 But as I demonstrate, each transparency 
campaign’s competing fix and vision of a more perfect, visible state rests on 
contested claims about the state’s legitimacy and performance, and competing 
theories of law, policy, and the state. That is, each movement and its fix implicate 
“transparency” in a much broader set of normative commitments. To understand 
transparency as an historically contingent concept and administrative norm, one 
must understand the political and social world within which it is defined by the 
networks, groups, and individuals who attempt to pressure the state to adopt their 
vision of visible, accountable governance. Viewed in context rather than simply as 
a transcendent normative goal or neutral technical tool, transparency emerges as a 
political concept that is deployed in diverse campaigns as a part of broader political 
and economic projects. 
Part I begins by introducing the legal-based and rights-based understanding of 
transparency that developed in the mid-twentieth century U.S. It describes that 
campaign’s two distinct stages: First, as World War II was winding down, 
newspaper editors’ trade groups sought to export free speech ideals and the model 
of an objective and independent press abroad to the new world that the post-war 
period seemed to herald. Later, those trade groups shifted their attention to what 
they saw as the growing problem of domestic state secrecy. This second period 
adapted the legalistic concepts of press freedom and rights that had been developed 
in the earlier period as a “right to know” and the “freedom of information” for the 
somewhat different project of advocating laws to require the U.S. government to 
disclose information to the public. Parts II through IV describe three contemporary 
movements that attempt to extend the transparency ideals in the U.S. and 
internationally: the transnational campaign to fight corruption (Part II); the effort to 
remake the state and its relationship to the public in a digital, networked world 
(Part III); and, in the WikiLeaks organization, the vigilante struggle to impose an 
                                                           
 
17 In earlier work, I have reviewed the normative and consequential literature on transparency, which 
focuses on its democratic and administrative benefits and costs; this large body of work considers what 
transparency does, not the political conditions under which transparency is adopted. See Fenster, supra 
note 3, at 894–910. Works that offer normative arguments in transparency’s favor provide brief accounts 
of the FOI movement and of more recent efforts to advocate transparency, but they generally provide 
little historical, political, and social context. See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, 
FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 24–29 (2007) (describing “The 
Struggle Toward Openness” and “A Slow March Toward Right-to-Know” before shifting to the history 
of disclosure-based regulation); SUZANNE J. PIOTROWSKI, GOVERNMENTAL TRANSPARENCY IN THE 
PATH OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 21–24 (2007) (providing an “overview and history of the federal 
FOIA” in a study of the relationship between open government and the new governance or new public 
management movement). 
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ethic of transparency on a recalcitrant state (Part IV). The conclusions to Parts II 
through IV provide a comparative perspective on the different campaigns, noting 
their continuities and discontinuities, and the Conclusion summarizes what this 
study reveals about transparency and the longing for a fix to the information 
asymmetry problem the state creates.18 
I. THE LEGAL RIGHTS FIX: FOIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
“RIGHT TO KNOW” AND “FREEDOM OF INFORMATION” 
In the decades following World War I and especially in the latter years of 
World War II, leading newspaper editors and press associations actively worked to 
export abroad the American model of a private, for-profit press insulated from 
government oversight and censorship. Frequently referred to as a plan to promote 
the “freedom of information” and the public’s “right to know,” the campaign 
rehearsed the ideas that would culminate decades later in the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA). In addition to advocating in favor of public access to 
government information as one among many issues, the campaign helped sharpen 
the arguments in favor of limiting state secrecy, and it established the press’ ability 
to collaborate with government entities to achieve that goal. The initial 
transparency advocacy movement eventually enjoyed legislative success and laid 
both the conceptual and organizational groundwork for what has become an 
international network of institutions advocating on behalf of transparency. 
A. Exporting Rights and Freedoms 
The initial campaign began as a response to two related issues: concerns about 
the availability of foreign markets for American newsgathering and distribution and 
a desire to export American free press and liberal democratic ideals. The American 
press and especially the American wire services—which supplied national and 
international news to many local newspapers and thus, at the time, were the 
country’s most global and national media firms—faced journalistic and economic 
constraints in attempting both to collect news in other countries and to export their 
products around the world. In the mid-nineteenth century, a cartel of major 
European news agencies, which included Reuters (Great Britain), Agence Havas 
(France), and Wolff (Germany) as its original members, had divided the world 
among themselves for purposes of newsgathering. They agreed both to geographic 
                                                           
 
18 My focus here is largely on efforts to address executive branch and administrative secrecy, but it can 
apply to campaigns focused on congressional secrecy. See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Digitally 
Democratizing Congress? Technology and Political Accountability, 89 B.U. L. REV. 641, 648–62 
(2009) (describing efforts to use the Internet to impose transparency on Congress). 
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constraints limiting themselves to their demarcated territories and to publish 
international news only from the cartel’s members.19 The American Associated 
Press (AP) was invited to join the cartel in 1887 and enjoyed the competitive 
advantages it provided for several decades.20 The AP did not find its participation 
entirely satisfactory, however. As the U.S. newspaper industry and the domestic 
market for news grew, the cartel’s constraints on the AP’s newsgathering 
operations abroad bridled the expanding company. The AP faced tougher domestic 
competition from the United Press (UP) (founded in 1907), which was 
unconstrained by the cartel agreement.21 At the same time, the AP had started its 
own newsgathering information in far-flung territories, first in South America and 
then around the world.22 
The AP was also concerned about the cartel’s effects on news content. The 
European agencies had formal and informal ties to national governments that 
sought to shape news for propagandistic ends. As a result, the AP complained, 
foreign media frequently under-reported news from the United States and described 
the country in an uncomplimentary fashion.23 For the American press, this potent 
and dangerous mix of troubling practices—individual wire services that had close 
relationships with their own governments, a cartel with oligopolistic control over 
international news distribution, and the lack of the objective news values that 
American news editors increasingly prized—endangered the press and nation’s 
political and economic interests.24 
These conditions prompted news organizations—as both interested parties 
and upholders of emergent ideals for a free press—to help develop entrepreneurial, 
independent news media around the world. In the narrative that Cold War 
                                                           
 
19 Terhi Rantanen, The Struggle for Control of Domestic News Markets (1), in THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
NEWS 35, 36–37 (Oliver Boyd-Barrett & Terhi Rantanen eds., 1998). 
20 Terhi Rantanen, Foreign Dependence and Domestic Monopoly: The European News Cartel and U.S. 
Associated Presses, 1861–1932, 12 MEDIA HIST. 19, 26–27 (2006) [hereinafter Rantanen, Foreign 
Dependence]. 
21 MARGARET BLANCHARD, EXPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6–7 (1986). 
22 Rantanen, Foreign Dependence, supra note 20, at 28–30. Indeed, the UP also directly competed with 
the cartel itself, leading the cartel finally to grant AP full membership in order to compete more 
effectively with UP’s challenge. Terhi Rantanen, Mr. Howard Goes to South America: The United Press 
Associations and Foreign Expansion, ROY W. HOWARD MONOGRAPHS IN JOURNALISM AND MASS 
COMM. RES., May 15, 1992, at 22–24. 
23 BLANCHARD, supra note 21, at 7; KENT COOPER, BARRIERS DOWN 43 (1942). 
24 OLIVER BOYD-BARRETT, THE INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCIES 209–11 (1980); COOPER, supra note 
23, at 43–44. 
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advocates constructed to tell the story about the necessity for informational 
freedom and rights,25 the AP’s commercial triumph, in which the agency and its 
powerful general manager Kent Cooper broke free from and helped smash the 
global news cartel in 1934, was not merely a self-serving effort to expand the 
company’s commercial reach. It also accompanied a full-fledged campaign to 
promote democracy.26 The cartel’s demise, coupled with the havoc wreaked on 
German and French news production by the Nazi party’s ascent and Germany’s 
subsequent occupation of France in World War II, allowed American corporate 
entities to seize market share and gain influence through the distribution of news 
and propaganda to Western Europe and developing countries in the post-war 
period.27 Once the cartel was broken, Cooper proclaimed, no more would such a 
“perfect instrument that could covertly, effectively and without the suspicion of the 
uninitiated carry on the great game of international government propaganda.”28 
Indeed, as the AP and UP began to coordinate as well as compete, the U.S. 
emerged in the post-war period as the only nation with multiple news services, 
helping it to take a leading position in the global competition over news and media 
content.29 The American press’ triumphant effort to advance what it viewed as the 
                                                           
 
25 On the relationship between ideals of the “free flow of information” and the Cold War, see Hanno 
Hardt, Comparative Media Research: The World According to America, 5 CRITICAL STUD. MASS 
COMM. 129, 132–33 (1988). 
26 GRAHAM STOREY, REUTERS’ CENTURY, 1851–1951, at 186–94 (1951); HERBERT BRUCKER, 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 214–15 (1949). Significantly, Cooper gave his memoir of the AP’s fight 
against the cartel, published in the midst of World War II, the martial title Barriers Down. Cooper’s 
story was self-serving and not entirely true; the AP, in fact, had a more complex, often friendly 
relationship with the government-controlled members of the international press cartel, and its efforts 
were as much in response to competition from the United Press as for a broader ideological or 
nationalistic purpose. See TERHI RANTANEN, AFTER FIVE O’CLOCK FRIENDS: KENT COOPER AND ROY 
W. HOWARD 25–27 (1998). 
27 One can view this critically, as a form of cultural imperialism, see, for example, HERBERT SCHILLER, 
MASS COMMUNICATIONS AND AMERICAN EMPIRE 24–45 (1969); Altaf Gauhar, Free Flow of 
Information: Myths and Shibboleths, 1 THIRD WORLD Q. 53, 53–54 (1979), or as a means to lower 
barriers that stopped content and commerce from flowing freely among nations for ideological and 
commercial reasons, see for example Erwin D. Canham, International Freedom of Information, 14 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 584, 584–85 (1949). 
28 KENT COOPER, THE RIGHT TO KNOW 154 (1956). 
29 DANIEL R. HEADRICK, THE INVISIBLE WEAPON: TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS 1851–1945, at 189–90 (1991); EMILY S. ROSENBERG, WORLD WAR I AND THE GROWTH OF 
UNITED STATES PREDOMINANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 187 (1987). 
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free markets it needed to thrive was ideological as well as profitable,30 a fact 
occasionally remarked upon by European skeptics.31 
Having defeated its competitors abroad, the American press turned 
evangelical. In its 1944 convention, the American Society of Newspaper Editors 
(ASNE), the most active trade group representing news editors and journalists, 
announced a campaign to protect “the right of the people” against censorship and to 
advocate for “freedom of information” around the world.32 The campaign included 
a world tour undertaken (with the assistance of the State Department) by three 
editors during the waning days of the war to review the state of the press in other 
                                                           
 
30 See, e.g., Kent Cooper, Newspaper Statesmanship for Peace, in JOURNALISM IN WARTIME 214, 215–
16 (Frank Luther Mott ed., 1943) (noting, in a short article exhorting the press to exert itself in peace 
negotiations because of the importance of a free press and informed public to ending wars, the 
relationship between wars and the prosperity of the international news industry). 
31 In the most public such episode, the British magazine, the Economist, viewed Cooper’s aggressive 
efforts to expand the AP as an independent source of news throughout the world quite skeptically, 
complaining that he 
experiences a peculiar moral glow in finding that his idea of freedom 
coincides with commercial advantage. In his ode to liberty there is no 
suggestion that when all barriers are down the huge financial resources of the 
American agencies might enable them to dominate the world. . . . 
[D]emocracy does not necessarily mean making the whole world safe for the 
A.P. 
The Press: Storm Warning, TIME (Dec. 11, 1944), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 
0,9171,883902,00.html (quoting the Economist). In a response published in Time, Cooper suggested that 
perhaps the Economist wanted the British to control world communications. Id. Five years later, in his 
book Freedom of Information, Herbert Brucker explicitly defended the confluence of free press and 
enterprise and asked, “Suppose there is opportunity for commercial gain in striking down the barriers 
that block nation off from nation—is it not still a good idea?” BRUCKER, supra note 26, at 215. Whether 
a “good idea” or not, Cooper sought to do more than simply counter foreign propaganda with the 
products and viewpoints of the American press; the AP’s work preeminently served the commercial 
interests of American media industries that exported their news reporting abroad via their wire services 
and to open those markets to American reporters—all as part of American companies’ efforts to 
compete against the press services of other nations. For a general description of the incident and of the 
ongoing tensions between American and European diplomats and press representatives in the post-war 
negotiations about United Nations freedom of information agreements, see BLANCHARD, supra note 21, 
at 23–25. 
32 George Kennedy, Advocates of Openness: The Freedom of Information Movement (Aug. 1978) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri at Columbia) (on file with author). Cooper 
himself called for such a campaign that same year in the pages of Life. See Kent Cooper, Freedom of 
Information: Head of Associated Press Calls for Unhampered Flow of World News, LIFE, Nov. 13, 
1944, at 55. 
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nations,33 lobbying efforts on behalf of international rights for a free press in the 
new United Nations,34 and collaboration with the Truman administration to spur 
development of an international press industry that would adopt the American 
model of the profession.35 Press representatives ultimately played key roles in the 
Sub-commission on Freedom of Information created by the UN’s Human Rights 
Commission in 1947 and, alongside prominent Harvard constitutional law 
professor Zechariah Chafee, served as delegates to the Conference on Freedom of 
Information held in Geneva in 1948.36 
In a 1949 article, Erwin Canham, editor of the Christian Science Monitor, 
officer of the American Society of News Editors, and member of the American 
delegation in Geneva,37 surveyed journalistic practices around the world and 
ranked them against the preeminent work of the American media in supporting the 
American democratic model. None quite matched up, although Canada and Britain 
came close. Therefore, Canham argued, the U.S. must spearhead the effort to free 
the flow of information throughout the world and thereby expand political freedom 
and fight the growing threat of authoritarianism: 
Of course, despotisms of various degrees will finally end when the people really 
know what is happening to them—when they learn the facts of international and 
national life—and thus throw off their chains. Freer information, in the broadest 
sense, will ultimately bring tyranny down. And so the efforts to lower barriers 
will ultimately produce conditions that will bring about a truly free press 
everywhere.38 
The specter of “tyranny” he identified meant the Soviet Union, of course, the 
principal Cold War threat. Alongside many of his fellow prominent newspaper 
editors, Canham played a semi-official role in the United States’ effort to spread its 
vision of a liberal democracy abroad. For Canham and his colleagues, the ideal 
                                                           
 
33 See ALICE FOX PITTS, READ ALL ABOUT IT! 50 YEARS OF ASNE 174–81 (1974). The tour was led by 
led by Ralph McGill, an editor for the Atlanta Journal-Constitution and chairman of the ASNE’s 
Freedom of Information Committee. See Leonard Ray Teel, The Shaping of a Southern Opinion Leader: 
Ralph McGill and Freedom of Information, 5 AM. JOURNALISM 14, 14–27 (1988). 
34 BLANCHARD, supra note 21, at 52–89; PITTS, supra note 33, at 182–85. 
35 BLANCHARD, supra note 21, at 2. 
36 Id. at 155–63, 174–97. 
37 Id. at 174–75. 
38 Canham, supra note 27, at 589 (A typographical error in original source was corrected here.). 
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press was private, independent, and capable of objectively reporting on events, and 
enjoyed and helped enforce liberal democratic rights. The press under an 
authoritarian government, by contrast, served as the state’s mouthpiece, a 
propaganda organ rather than a true Fourth Estate. A truly free press, therefore, 
required not only a private, independent set of media institutions but also a limited, 
non-intrusive state. It was up to the U.S. and its press institutions to spread the 
word.39 
Ironically, this project—intended to promote the ideals of a free press—
required underwriting by the very government whose clutches journalists feared. 
The midcentury American press viewed the federal government’s intervention in 
the marketplace of ideas and news as a significant, authoritarian-like threat to 
American democracy.40 During World War I and its aftermath, the government had 
not only acted as an official censor, a traditional role for the state during wartime, 
but also as a major producer of informational content akin to propaganda.41 The 
government’s post-war informational activities now included pushing material to 
the public in order to grab the attention and shape the attitudes of its citizens, like 
the growing consumer-goods industries that utilized press agents and advertisers to 
push their interests and hawk their wares.42 For the editors who sought its support 
                                                           
 
39 During the Cold War, scholars and journalists noted that different approaches to press freedoms 
existed, that nation states generally adopted one of them and disdained the others, and that the 
underlying theory justifying each approach rested on the political theory underlying each nation’s 
regime. The American model was decidedly “libertarian” or classically liberal, and contrasted with the 
authoritarian, Soviet communist (which scholars differentiated from the authoritarian model) and social-
democratic, “social responsibility” models. See generally FRED S. SIEBERT, THEODORE PETERSON & 
WILBUR SCHRAMM, FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS (1956); see also WILLIAM E. BERRY ET AL., LAST 
RIGHTS: REVISITING FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS 7–16 (John C. Nerone ed., 1995) (historicizing and 
updating the “Four Theories” model). 
40 COOPER, supra note 28, at 64, 95–96, 147–48; BRUCKER, supra note 26, at 221. This conflict arose 
not only from the importance the press placed on its independence from the state. Newspaper publishers 
tended to be quite conservative and disliked President Roosevelt, the Democratic Party, and the New 
Deal. See BLANCHARD, supra note 21, at 2. 
41 COOPER, supra note 28, at 163–65. 
42 See id. at 308 (warning that a passive “American layman,” allowing the state to “do[] his thinking for 
him,” will allow the government to infringe his “Right to Know”). Cooper’s concern about propaganda 
spread by government press agents was widely shared in the 1930s. See E. PENDLETON HERRING, 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 362–67, 373–76 (1936) (describing the Roosevelt 
administration’s increasing use of “public relations” professionals in its attempt to manage publicity and 
the press); MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS 134–44 (1978) (discussing generally the 
press’ distaste for the public relations industry); see, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, INDIVIDUALISM OLD AND NEW 
43 (1930) (characterizing the “publicity agent” as “the most significant symbol of our present social 
life”). 
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in their international campaign, the state thus represented both a means to project 
press freedom ideals and a grave threat to the press’ crucial role in reporting news 
objectively and thoroughly.43 
In this sense, the movement to export First Amendment and journalistic 
values also reflected a strong professional identity among the press leaders who 
viewed the journalistic enterprise as free, independent, and objective, and staffed 
by full-time, well-trained, professional journalists.44 Journalistic objectivity in this 
context served as an American professional ideal and norm, and stood in opposition 
to political and ideological partisanship and to subjective or biased reporting.45 In 
journalism historian Michael Schudson’s authoritative account, objectivity defines 
and disciplines journalism as a vocation: it binds publishers, reporters, and editors 
together through a series of rituals that define what journalism is and how it is 
produced; it allows constituents of the journalistic community to recognize and 
exclude those who fail to practice it correctly; and it organizes the bureaucratic 
                                                           
 
43 State influence on the press and the public was not the press’ only concern about government 
interference. During the New Deal, the Roosevelt administration had fought to impose against news 
organizations federal laws and regulations that applied to employers, including the Social Security Act, 
the National Industrial Recovery Act, federal labor laws, and the Wagner Labor Relations Act, as well 
as federal laws and regulations intended to regulate advertising. Claiming that these laws would infringe 
constitutional free speech rights if applied to the press—an argument that the press lost—newspapers 
and their owners, whose relative conservatism made them skeptical, if not hostile, to the New Deal 
anyway, resisted the state’s intrusion into their business. Margaret A. Blanchard, The Hutchins 
Commission, The Press and the Responsibility Concept, JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS, May 1977, at 4–8. 
As the Supreme Court declared in Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937), “[t]he publisher 
of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws.” 
44 On the history of journalism’s understanding of itself as a profession with a distinct and crucial social 
and political position and a self-developed and enforced code of conduct, see Howard Tumber & Marina 
Prentoulis, Journalism and the Making of a Profession, in MAKING JOURNALISTS 58, 60–68 (Hugo de 
Burgh ed., 2005). The Commission on Freedom of the Press, a private, widely heralded group of leading 
academics and government officials brought together under the leadership of Robert Hutchins, president 
of the University of Chicago at the time, declared in its 1947 final report that the press had the social 
and professional responsibility to provide “full access to the day’s intelligence” and a “truthful, 
comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day’s events in a context which gives them meaning.” 
COMM’N ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 21, 28 (1947). On the Hutchins 
Commission generally, see Blanchard, supra note 43, at 88–89. 
45 Wolfgang Donsbach, Lapdogs, Watchdogs and Junkyard Dogs, 9 MEDIA STUD. J. 17 (1995); Gaye 
Tuchman, Objectivity as Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmen’s Notions of Objectivity, 77 AM. 
J. OF SOC. 660, 660–78 (1972). A foil that freedom-of-information advocates employed for purposes of 
defining objectivity were publications produced by and for particular private interest groups, especially 
the labor press supported by unions. See LEONARD RAY TEEL, THE PUBLIC PRESS, 1900–1945, at 172–
74 (2006); BRUCKER, supra note 26, at 248–51. 
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practice of journalism and the training of those who wish to enter the profession.46 
The objectivity ideal helps justify the press’ explicit right to be free from 
government constraint, and it constitutes the pillar of the press’ role as an 
independent institution of civil society—one just as important to the protection of 
individual rights and democratic institutions as an independent judiciary. 
B. The Right to Know and Freedom of Information, from Press 
Ideals to Legal Informational Rights 
All of the circumstances described above—the political economy of the 
international news industry, the AP’s struggles with the European news cartel, the 
emergent ideal of press freedom during the gathering Cold War, and the press’ self-
conception of journalism as a vocation organized around the objective reporting of 
news—contributed to the historical context in which the phrases “freedom of 
information” and the “right to know” began to circulate. Kent Cooper used the 
phrase “right to know” as early as 1945 and as the title of his 1956 book on the 
general topic of press freedom.47 He defined it both affirmatively, as the right of 
individuals to have access to full and accurate news reporting, and negatively, as 
prohibiting the government from interfering with the relationship between the press 
and its public. “It means,” he wrote, “that the government may not, and the 
newspapers and broadcasters should not, by any method whatever, curb delivery of 
any information essential to the public welfare and enlightenment.”48 He also 
offered a modern revision of the Constitution’s First Amendment: “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the Right to Know through the oral or printed word or 
any other means of communicating ideas or intelligence.”49 In Cooper’s 
understanding, the right to information belongs to the public; the state has the legal 
duty to disclose and is prohibited from restraining the press; and the independent 
commercial press serves as the essential go-between with an ethical, as opposed to 
legal, duty to ferret out and present information. The press—which enjoys a 
longstanding and well-entrenched constitutional right—would protect the public’s 
right by transforming data into knowledge and thereby allow the reading public to 
respond rationally and act politically, as capable democratic citizens. 
                                                           
 
46 Michael Schudson, The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism, 2 JOURNALISM 149, 151–52, 165–
67 (2001). 
47 COOPER, supra note 28; The Right to Know, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1945, at 18. 
48 COOPER, supra note 28, at 16. 
49 Id. 
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The term “freedom of information” had a similar meaning. President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt used it in a press conference in 1940 to refer to the flow of 
uncensored news, identifying it as one of the key principles of democratic 
government and the un-enumerated freedoms that the Constitution set in motion,50 
while President Truman used it similarly in a message to Congress in 1947 
reporting on U.S. participation in the United Nations.51 At the same time, news 
editors viewed and deployed the phrase as part of the broad ideal of press freedom. 
The ASNE established a “Freedom of Information Committee” to push for 
international speech liberalization, and Herbert Brucker, one of that committee’s 
chairmen during the early post-war period, appropriated the term as the title for his 
1949 book on the need for press freedom.52 The nascent international human rights 
movement appropriated the phrase as well. In its first meeting in 1946, the United 
Nations General Assembly issued a declaration calling for recognizing and 
protecting the freedom of information as a fundamental, “touchstone” human right 
while defining it quite broadly: “Freedom of information implies the right to 
gather, transmit and publish news anywhere and everywhere without fetters.”53 
                                                           
 
50 CASS SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE 
NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 78–79 (2004). The phrase did not appear in FDR’s “four freedoms” speech 
he made to Congress in 1941, which instead only referred to the “freedom of speech and expression—
everywhere in the world.” 
51 See President Harry S. Truman, Message to the Congress Transmitting First Annual Report on U.S. 
Participation in the United Nations (Feb. 5, 1947), available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/ 
publicpapers/index.php?pid=2225 (equating the concept with “action to break down the barriers to a 
wider, freer flow of information in the world”); see also Sanford J. Ungar, The Role of a Free Press 
Strengthening Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA 368, 393 (Judith Lichtenberg ed., 
1990) (reporting Truman’s use of the phrase in several speeches in 1947). 
52 TEEL, supra note 45, at 17–18; BRUCKER, supra note 26; Kiyul Uhm, The Cold War Communication 
Crisis: The Right to Know Movement, 82 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 131, 139 (2005). Brucker 
added a further meaning defining the term as a key element in the relationship between the press and its 
public: “freedom of information for newspapers and related media will have not only the historic sense 
of freedom from government but also include freedom from any attachment, direct or indirect, to any 
class, political party, economic group, or other fraction of society.” BRUCKER, supra note 26, at 276. 
His definition suggested in its breadth (which went beyond the Bill of Rights’ much simpler check on 
state power) the concern that the press must report news free from biases that would arise from 
“attachment” to anything besides the professional norms of objective reportage. Freedom of information 
was an institutional freedom for the press from external interference of any kind, including the state and 
private interests. 
53 G.A. Res. 59, U.N. DOC. A/RES/59(I) (Dec. 14, 1946), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/ 
asp/ws.asp?m=A/Res/59(I). Two years later, a draft convention on Freedom of Information that failed to 
garner sufficient support defined the term as “the free interchange of information and opinions, both in 
the national and in the international sphere.” BLANCHARD, supra note 21, at 410–14. Although Article 
19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted the general language of free expression and 
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As concepts, the right to know and freedom of information overlap in a 
number of important ways and have endured as key phrases in the movement for 
open government. First, although they concern much more than simply government 
information, the concepts identified and sought to protect an international and 
national right that would limit the state’s control of information flows. Second, they 
conceptualized the state as something distinct from the public—as an entity that 
represents and governs its citizens but is distant from them. The public must be 
protected from the state, while the state must be checked from violating private 
individuals’ rights, which in this context meant the right to receive information and 
to “know.” Third, the terms assume that information, in its raw and cooked forms 
as data, news stories, and opinion, constitutes a truth to which the public must have 
access in order to gain knowledge and act as citizens. 
And finally, at least in its American version as defined by Cooper and 
Brucker, the terms contemplate a free and independent press as the public’s agent 
in protecting the right to know and in delivering the information that should flow 
freely. Rights (to know) and freedoms (of information) simultaneously enable the 
press to report objectively, without the constraints of excessive state or private 
interest, and allow that independent pillar of society to play its crucial role in a 
functional democracy. As the institution capable of mediating between the public 
and a distant, increasingly complex state, the press had come by midcentury to 
view itself as the community’s representative and enforcer of public rights, capable 
of unveiling and criticizing the state.54 “The right of the individual to know,” 
Cooper asserted, is “coordinated with the right of his newspaper to tell him all the 
news, except what the government was guilty of withholding and suppressing.”55 
The original FOI campaign’s goals were to transform that inchoate notion of 
“guilt” into a legal wrong and to transform the abstract ideal of a “right” into an 
enforceable cause of action for the individuals to whom it belonged. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
the right to receive and impart information, the more specific provisions considered in the 1948 
Convention on Freedom of Information, which both protected individuals from the state and allowed 
states to support and protect their domestic press (for example, “in the interest of national safety” and to 
“develop its national news enterprises”), faced significant opposition, not least from the U.S. delegation. 
On the influence of the press on the U.S. delegation, see id. at 174–75. 
54 James W. Carey, Journalism and Criticism: The Case of an Undeveloped Profession, 36 REV. OF POL. 
227, 231–33 (1974). 
55 COOPER, supra note 28, at 69. 
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C. The Political Enactment of Legal Informational Rights 
By the late 1940s, ASNE’s Freedom of Information Committee, having been 
frustrated in its efforts to formalize press freedoms in international law,56 turned its 
attention to press freedom in the U.S. and to one particular issue: government 
secrecy.57 Louisville Courier-Journal editor James Pope’s term as Committee 
chair, which started in 1950, proved integral to the organization’s shift towards a 
political fight against federal, state, and local government secrecy and in making 
the fight against it explicitly political. Pope’s committee began by organizing state-
level committees to help provide legal advocacy and defense on behalf of local 
newspapers, and to serve as the basis for an effort to change federal policy.58 Pope 
recruited Harold Cross, a retired media lawyer and journalism professor at 
Columbia, to serve as the Committee’s legal advisor.59 In this capacity, Cross 
produced The People’s Right to Know (1953), a book that both summarized the 
patchwork of existing constitutional and administrative laws regulating government 
secrecy and advocated for reforms to strengthen the public’s access to 
information.60 
As Pope noted in his foreword to Cross’ book, ASNE stood alongside Cross 
as an “agent of the people” to enforce the people’s right of access to information on 
the public’s behalf.61 In that role, Cross declared that the press would strike down 
“the barriers to access to public records and proceedings,”62 which was especially 
necessary, Pope noted, because citizens required assistance to understand an 
“increasingly complex government.”63 The title Cross chose at once echoed the 
rights concept from the press’ earlier advocacy of press freedoms abroad and 
                                                           
 
56 See supra note 53. 
57 DAVID R. DAVIES, THE POSTWAR DECLINE OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS, 1945–1965, at 31–38 (2006); 
HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW 14–18 (1999); Kennedy, 
supra note 32, at 24–28; PITTS, supra note 33, at 172–73. While some press advocates complained about 
government censorship during the war, see, e.g., Erwin D. Canham, The Battle for News, in 
JOURNALISM IN WARTIME, supra note 30, at 44 (complaining about censorship, though conceding that 
censorship in the U.S. during World War II was less onerous than in other countries), the press grew 
more publicly exorcised about post-war secrecy. 
58 Uhm, supra note 52, at 136–37. 
59 Id. at 134–38. 
60 HAROLD CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW (1953). 
61 James S. Pope, Foreword to CROSS, supra note 60, at vii. 
62 CROSS, supra note 60, at xiv. 
63 Pope, supra note 61, at ix. 
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framed the problem of secrecy as one of insufficiently enforced legal rights. The 
book opened with the most prominent terms from the earlier free press campaign: 
Public business is the public’s business. The people have the right to know. 
Freedom of information is their just heritage. Without that the citizens of a 
democracy have but changed their kings.64 
“Rights” against the state, along with the ideal of “freedom” from state 
barriers to access, served as the logical way for a legal advocate like Cross to 
champion transparency. But the prevailing law of access to government 
information, Cross complained, was a mess; it existed only “where you find it,” in 
a “welter of varying statutes, conflicting court opinions and wordy departmental 
regulations [that] present the problem as a veritable Chinese puzzle.”65 The 
resulting information-access law could not confront and control the expansion of 
Cold War secrecy. Quoting a recent student-authored law review publication, Cross 
lamented the fact that access to information was “a neglected constitutional 
right,”66 and argued that it ought to be encompassed within First Amendment 
protections. To that end, he cited a range of historical and contemporary figures for 
support.67 His efforts to find a constitutional basis for the “right to know” have 
proved unavailing, however, as the U.S. Supreme Court has never acknowledged 
such a broad right to informational access in the Bill of Rights. Nevertheless, 
                                                           
 
64 CROSS, supra note 60, at xiii. Other books from the mid-1950s by prominent editors and activists in 
the older international free press movement employed the term “right to know” as including the right of 
access to information. COOPER, supra note 28, at 283–88; JAMES RUSSELL WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR 
SECRECY 3–4 (1956). Following Cross, Wiggins—himself a former ASNE FOI Committee chair—
advocated establishing an enforceable right to know. Id. at 71. On Wiggins, see Uhm, supra note 52, at 
138–39. 
65 CROSS, supra note 60, at 4, 6, 10. 
66 Note, Access to Official Information: A Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 IND. L.J. 209 (1952) 
(relying largely on state court decisions and the statements of figures like James Madison and Thomas 
Cooley to support its argument). 
67 CROSS, supra note 60, at 129–32. Zechariah Chafee’s 1947 treatise Government and Mass 
Communications noted the problem of expanded secrecy in the post-war era but did not develop the 
First Amendment argument that Cross would later pursue. 1 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT 
AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS: A REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 12–13 
(1947). In Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948), Alexander Meiklejohn included the 
claim that the democratic values inherent in the First Amendment must allow the public access to 
information, but he never specifically considers the relevance and problem of state information. 
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONS TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26, 66, 89 (1948). 
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academics and advocates, most prominently First Amendment scholar Thomas 
Emerson, have repeated Cross’ argument in the decades that followed.68 
As an alternative, Cross offered federal legislation as a second-best path to 
legal rights. The Administrative Procedure Act, enacted in 1946, provided both a 
model of statutory control over administrative agency operations and a potential 
home for a freedom of information act. But it would require amendment, as its 
existing information-access provisions were too vague and riddled with exceptions; 
it also failed to create an enforceable public right to information that would allow 
an aggrieved citizen (whether or not a member of the press) to seek judicial review 
of a government entity’s refusal to disclose information.69 To bridge this 
substantive and procedural gap, Cross urged Congress to “begin exercising 
effectually its function to legislate freedom of information for itself, the public, and 
the press” by creating a legal right to know.70 Cross’ argument certainly convinced 
his ASNE sponsors; “[e]nlisted as an adviser,” James Pope wrote, “he became our 
leader.”71 
Soon after the publication of Cross’ book in 1953, the ASNE Committee 
finally found a potentially effective political government actor and partner for 
establishing the legal rights that Cross described. In November 1954, a new 
Democratic majority wrestled control of the U.S. House of Representatives back 
from a small Republican majority that had ridden Dwight Eisenhower’s coattails in 
his 1952 election to a first presidential term. Although Eisenhower’s moderate 
                                                           
 
68 Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 1–24 (1976). A 
more recent legal academic advocate of the constitutional basis for an access right is Heidi Kitrosser, 
who, like Cross and Emerson, has argued that access rights are a subset of free speech rights, whose 
purpose is to enable democratic self-government and check government abuses. See Heidi Kitrosser, 
Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the Right To Know in the Administrative 
State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 125–45 (2004). For more wide-ranging summaries of the human 
rights-based arguments in favor of a right to information, see Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, supra 
note 6, at 88–93, and Roy Peled & Yoram Rabin, The Constitutional Right to Information, 42 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 357, 359–73 (2011). 
69 CROSS, supra note 60, at 223–25. The APA’s original government information provision included 
exceptions for information involved in “any function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public 
interest” and allowed information not otherwise barred from disclosure by statute to be made available 
by published rule “to persons properly and directly concerned except information held confidential for 
good cause found.” Id. at 226 (quoting 5 U.S.C.A. § 1002(1), 1002(c) (1946)). In addition to analyzing 
the APA’s weaknesses, Cross’s book also listed all of the existing statutory exceptions from disclosure. 
Id. at 231–34. 
70 CROSS, supra note 60, at 246. 
71 Pope, supra note 61, at xi. 
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conservatism held at arm’s length both Senator Joseph McCarthy (whose 
prominence was fast receding by 1954) and his vice president Richard Nixon, 
politics was politics, and the Executive Branch’s expansion during the New Deal 
and its administrative prerogative over government secrets following the end of 
World War II constituted a source of political conflict. Democrats had controlled 
the Presidency since Franklin Roosevelt’s election in 1932; now, even with a 
moderate war hero in the White House and a common enemy in the Soviet Union, 
the Congress viewed its role vis-à-vis an electoral foe as both a principled, 
institutional opposition to the Executive and a political opposition to a Republican. 
To that end, the House of Representatives’ Government Operations Committee, 
chaired by Democratic Representative William Dawson of Illinois, established a 
Special Subcommittee on Government Information, chaired by California 
Representative John Moss, as a means to investigate Executive Branch secrecy.72 
ASNE leaders and prominent newspaper editors played key roles in spurring 
the Subcommittee that Moss chaired (referred to popularly as “the Moss 
Committee”) into action.73 The press provided personnel, with former journalists 
dominating the Committee’s staff, while prominent editors helped devise its 
aggressive strategy of investigating federal agencies that kept information secret 
from the press and public.74 ASNE provided legal advice by introducing Cross to 
Moss and his Committee; Cross would play a key role as the Committee’s legal 
advisor until his death in 1959.75 The press also provided publicity, as newspapers 
throughout the country promoted the Committee’s work and especially its hearings 
and investigations.76 And, through its lobbying and Cross’s advice, the press helped 
                                                           
 
72 On the political nature of the Moss hearings (at least in their early years), see Sam Archibald, The 
Early Years of the Freedom of Information Act—1955 to 1974, 26 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 726 (1993); 
Robert Okie Blanchard, The Moss Committee and a Federal Public Records Law, 1955–1965 (1966) 
[hereinafter Blanchard, Federal Public Records Law] (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse 
University) (on file with author); Richard G. Gray, Freedom of Access to Government Information (A 
Study of the Federal Executive) (1964) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota) (on 
file with author). Dawson’s appointment as chair of Government Operations in 1948 was contested, 
especially by southern Democrats, in part because he was African American; one of his strengths was 
his strong loyalty to party leadership. See CHRISTOPHER MANNING, WILLIAM L. DAWSON AND THE 
LIMITS OF BLACK ELECTORAL LEADERSHIP 119–21 (2009). 
73 Archibald, supra note 72, at 726–27. 
74 Archibald, supra note 72, at 727; Blanchard, Federal Public Records Law, supra note 72, at 108–25; 
Kennedy, supra note 32, at 64–73. 
75 Kennedy, supra note 32, at 68–70, 94–96. 
76 Robert O. Blanchard, Present at the Creation: The Media and the Moss Committee, 1972 
JOURNALISM Q. 271, 272–74 (1972) [hereinafter Blanchard, Present at the Creation]. 
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frame the issue for the Committee as one of insufficiently recognized and enforced 
legal rights. In James Pope’s words when he testified at the Moss Committee’s first 
hearing, “freedom of information is not a political issue. . . . The right to know is 
the right of the people.”77 Tellingly, Harold Cross’ argument in favor of imposing 
legal obligations through the creation of private statutory rights proved ultimately 
to be the only satisfactory legislative solution to secrecy. After an amendment to 
existing law failed to change bureaucratic norms,78 the Freedom of Information 
Act—a statute whose very title was apparently appropriated from the title of ASNE 
member Herbert Brucker’s 1949 book79—finally gained sufficient legislative 
support in 1966, cleared Congress’s procedural hurdles, and was enacted despite 
President Johnson’s ambivalence (if not resigned hostility).80 
The FOIA enacted a version of a “right to know” and pledged to protect the 
informational “freedom” that had been first conceptualized and developed in the 
early post-war and Cold War effort to instill Western democratic values abroad 
through the ideal of a free, independent press. In its original enactment and in 
subsequent amendments, Congress has continually recognized and proclaimed the 
crucial role that the right to know and informational freedom play in a 
democracy81—legislative declarations that courts have consistently restated when 
reviewing claims filed under the FOIA.82 The statute recognized an individual right 
                                                           
 
77 Uhm, supra note 52, at 140; Kennedy, supra note 32, at 96. 
78 See Gerald Wetlaufer, Justifying Secrecy: An Objection to the General Deliberative Privilege, 65 IND. 
L.J. 845, 868–69 (1990). On the Subcommittee’s frustrations with the inadequate results of its 
successful amendment to the 1789 Housekeeping Statute under which executive agencies refused to 
disclose documents, see FOERSTEL, supra note 57, at 33–35; Blanchard, Federal Public Records Law, 
supra note 72, at 127–35; Kennedy, supra note 32, at 90–92. 
79 Archibald, supra note 72, at 728; Blanchard, Present at the Creation, supra note 76, at 276; Kennedy, 
supra note 32, at 69–70. After Cross’s death, Jacob Scher, another media lawyer and journalism 
professor, took his place as the Moss Committee’s legal advisor and continued to follow Cross’s 
approach. Blanchard, Federal Public Records Law, supra note 72, at 89–91, 138–39. 
80 Archibald, supra note 72, at 729–30; Blanchard, Federal Public Records Law, supra note 72, at 167–
210. 
81 See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 12 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2429 (“A democratic 
society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate varies as the 
quantity and quality of its information varies.”). 
82 See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (“[T]he basic purpose of 
FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to 
check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.”); EPA v. Mink, 410 
U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (“[FOIA was] broadly conceived. . . . to permit access to official information long 
shielded unnecessarily from public view and . . . to create a judicially enforceable public right to secure 
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to information and granted broad private rights to any person to seek judicial 
enforcement of those rights—rights that were themselves balanced against the 
state’s need to keep some information from the public eye.83 Placing certain 
procedural burdens on agencies and creating a private right of action for aggrieved 
individuals, the FOIA delegated to the federal judiciary the task of protecting the 
right and enforcing the duties. Working together, Congress and the press had 
placed the right to know firmly within the institutional framework of the rule of 
law: agencies would henceforth have to follow legislatively prescribed rules 
enforced by the Judiciary, while the press would serve as a private enforcement 
mechanism, harnessing this newly established right to hold the government 
accountable and inform the public. 
D. Conclusion: The Limits of Law 
Traditional legal concepts—the judicial enforcement of individual rights and 
those of the press—animated and grounded an American open-government 
movement that viewed the state as a threat to democracy and press freedom. In its 
actions against the state, the press worked with state actors—an ironic element in 
any reformist, civil-libertarian movement and one that has remained consistent 
from the World War II period through FOIA’s enactment.84 These efforts assumed 
and helped constitute an institutional structure for these rights: the press, acting as 
the public’s agent, would advance and take advantage of the right to know; 
Congress and the courts would play key roles in helping to enforce them; and 
information would thereby be freed for the public to consume and act upon in its 
members’ role as democratic citizens. The rhetoric was broad and the terms 
powerful because the stakes were so high. A democratic system demanded no less 
than committed political advocacy, especially in the midst of a Cold War that 
produced an enormous quantity of state secrets but that required a free and 
independent press to remain legitimate and accountable.85 
                                                                                                                                      
 
such information from possibly unwilling official hands.”), superseded by statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), 
as recognized in C.I.A. v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985). 
83 Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, §§ (c), (e), 80 Stat. 250, 251 (requiring 
agencies to make records available to “any person” and providing private right of action to challenge an 
agency’s refusal to disclose, while also enumerating exemptions to disclosure) (amended 1996). 
84 See DAVIES, supra note 57, at 32. 
85 This campaign also represents the first instance in which the U.S. sought to export its ideals of press 
freedoms abroad, an idea that would largely end with the shift towards fighting government secrecy; it 
would later be resurrected in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. See CRAIG L. LAMAY, 
EXPORTING PRESS FREEDOM: ECONOMIC AND EDITORIAL DILEMMAS IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIA 
ASSISTANCE 76–84 (2007). 
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The American FOIA is now merely one legislative enactment in a much 
broader universe of legal rights and duties created by constitutional and legislative 
mandates in order to advance some ideal or component of transparency. FOI 
provisions regulate government activity around the world as well as in American 
states and localities.86 The proliferation of legal rights has not created fully or, to 
many in the transparency-advocacy community, even satisfactorily open 
governments, as political, practical, and bureaucratic obstacles have obstructed the 
state’s visibility to the public.87 In the U.S., the annual Sunshine Week and 
Freedom of Information Day events, established in 2005 to bring attention to 
freedom of information laws, include a regular declaration that more must be done 
to open government to the public’s gaze.88 International FOI advocates express the 
same frustration with other nations’ compliance with their own laws.89 Even when 
enacted, formal legal commands by themselves have not been able to overcome all 
forms and instances of governmental resistance to disclosure, whether that 
resistance is intended to hide corruption or incompetence, or as sincere efforts to 
protect internal deliberative processes, or simply because officials find it easier and 
less costly not to disclose information. 
Despite these frustrations—or perhaps because of them—numerous FOI 
NGOs still actively advocate for a classically liberal, rights-focused approach to 
transparency and continue to view the press as the essential mediating institution 
                                                           
 
86 On the international FOI movement, see Lawrence Repeta, Mr. Madison in the Twenty-first Century: 
Global Diffusion of the People’s “Right to Know,” in SOFT POWER SUPERPOWERS: CULTURAL AND 
NATIONAL ASSETS OF JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 245, 250–55 (Watanabe Yasushi & David L. 
McConnell eds., 2008); Thomas Blanton, The World’s Right to Know, FOREIGN POL’Y, July–Aug. 2002, 
at 50; Greg Michener, FOI Laws Around the World, 22 J. DEMOCRACY 145, 145–46 (2011). On state 
FOI laws in the U.S., see 2 JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 27 (3d ed. 
2010). For an introduction to the small universe of local FOI ordinances in the U.S., see Mark Fenster, 
Local Transparency (May 10, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
87 These frustrations began soon after FOIA’s enactment. See JAMES BRIAN MCPHERSON, JOURNALISM 
AT THE END OF THE AMERICAN CENTURY, 1965–PRESENT, at 50–51 (2006). On the difficulties of 
achieving a fully transparent state, see Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62 
ADMIN. L. REV. 617 (2010) [hereinafter Fenster, Seeing the State]. 
88 See About Sunshine Week, SUNSHINE WEEK: YOUR RIGHT TO KNOW, http://www.sunshineweek.org/ 
About.aspx (last visited July 15, 2012). 
89 See, e.g., Lalanath de Silva, Freedom of Information Laws Spreading Around the World, WORLD RES. 
INST. (Sept. 26, 2010), http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/09/freedom-information-laws-spreading-
around-world (describing and celebrating new freedom of information laws but noting that “there is still 
a lot that needs to be done to improve implementation of these laws. Our research has shown that 
practice lags behind.”). 
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capable of enforcing legal rights and informing the public.90 But in part as a 
response to the frustrations that this resistance causes, and in part due to other 
factors—including developments in information technology, changing conceptions 
of the state, and the political economy of global commerce and international 
financial institutions (IFIs)—some contemporary advocacy groups have broadened 
their approach to understanding the asymmetric information problem, and 
champion new approaches to transparency that look beyond formal law and its 
enforcement. The remainder of this article outlines these alternative fixes to the 
problem of government secrecy—fixes that either view legal reform as part of a 
broader program or that abandon law altogether. 
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FIX: ANTI-
CORRUPTION AS TRANSPARENCY 
Although it prominently incorporates transparency in its name and holds the 
transparency.org URL for its website, Transparency International (TI) is part of a 
movement that views transparency as one among a diverse set of tools that can 
achieve its larger goal of fighting corruption. TI puts transparency to work for a 
more specific, substantive goal than the FOI movement, which focuses more 
broadly on legal rights and a well-informed public. As this Part explains, TI 
advocates traditional legal rights to information but concentrates its efforts on 
building a transnational network of independent institutions that can fight 
corruption and distribute information on government performance, and that 
emphasizes economic development over democratic norms (without, to be sure, 
ignoring democratic norms entirely). 
Before discussing transparency’s role as a concept and policy goal in this 
movement, the movement and its more general project require some introduction. 
The transnational anti-corruption movement that TI helped spark advocates on 
behalf of administrative practices and institutional arrangements that can improve 
the integrity of states and their economies.91 It has both responded to and helped 
                                                           
 
90 See supra note 6. Some such organizations, such as the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press 
(established in 1970) and the National Freedom of Information Coalition (established in 1989), have had 
longstanding and institutional commitments to supporting the press and are led by executives and board 
members from the institutional press and their legal representatives. See About The Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press: A Short History, THE REP. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http:// 
www.rcfp.org/about.html (last visited July 15, 2012); About NFOIC, NAT’L FREEDOM OF INFO. 
COALITION, http://www.nfoic.org/about-nfoic (last visited July 15, 2012); Board of Directors, NAT’L 
FREEDOM OF INFO. COALITION, http://www.nfoic.org/board-directors (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). 
91 On the then-nascent role of NGOs in the anti-corruption field, see SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, 
CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT 168–71 (1999). Transparency International’s history as the core NGO 
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spread the widely-held view that corruption, which it defines as “the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain,”92 constitutes a problem endemic to developing 
nations and a leading cause of underdevelopment and poverty. For the anti-
corruption community, corruption’s prevalence in the developing world helps 
explain the failure of the post-Cold War era to meet the potential offered by the 
global spread of democracy, the expansion of international trade, the privatization 
of inefficient state-owned enterprises, and the wealth created by extractive 
industries in resource-rich countries and regions.93 International financial 
institutions have more recently adopted measures that not only reflect the 
movement’s influence but also suggest that IFIs themselves now act as part of the 
movement in forcing transparency on foreign development and financing 
projects.94 
Together, TI and similar NGOs, along with the IFIs and intergovernmental 
organizations that have come to emphasize anti-corruption as an integral reform to 
political and economic development, form what anthropologist Steven Sampson 
has characterized as an “anti-corruption industry”—a combined political movement 
and social network composed of international and national elites that sponsors 
conferences, policy reports, and journals, all in the name of promoting good 
                                                                                                                                      
 
in this movement has been very well documented, both by TI members and by its critics. See Fredrik 
Galtung & Jeremy Pope, The Global Coalition Against Corruption: Evaluating Transparency 
International, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 
257 (Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1999) (account by TI’s first managing 
director and original staff member); Luís de Sousa & Peter Larmour, Transparency International: 
Global Franchising and the War of Information Against Corruption, in RESEARCH COMPANION TO 
CORRUPTION IN ORGANIZATIONS 269 (Ronald J. Burke & Cary L. Cooper eds., 2009) (critical account 
of TI’s history). 
92 About Us, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_ 
corruption/2/ (last visited July 15, 2012). 
93 See de Sousa & Larmour, supra note 91, at 270, 272. 
94 Beginning in 1998, the International Monetary Fund began its own efforts to impose and evangelize in 
favor of “fiscal transparency” in governments receiving IMF support. Manual on Fiscal Transparency: 
Introduction, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/manual/intro.htm (last 
visited July 15, 2012). In 2010, the World Bank implemented a new Public Access to Information 
policy, representing what the Bank characterized as “a sea change” in its approach to information access 
that would broaden disclosure and “allow for greater monitoring of Bank-supported projects, thereby 
enabling better development results.” News & Broadcast: World Bank Broadens Public Access to 
Information, WORLD BANK (July 1, 2010), http://go.worldbank.org/L3HF51WOX0; see also Rebecca 
Harris, Knowledge Is Power: Transparency and Participation Will Be the Drivers of Effective 
Development, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-
harris/knowledge-is-power-transp_b_851020.html; Stephanie Strom, Cracking Open the World Bank, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2011, at BU1. 
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governance in general and an understanding of “transparency” in particular.95 In its 
international operations, the shared values and common discourse of its members, 
and its exchange of information and services among members and with state 
officials, this “industry” constitutes a “transnational advocacy network” akin to 
those developed by human-rights, labor, and feminist activists.96 Representative of 
the “new transnational activism” of global NGOs, TI and the anti-corruption 
movement mobilize resources against state structures and officials by working 
simultaneously at two distinct levels: rooting their efforts in specific national 
contexts (through, for example, TI’s chapters and other national and local NGOs), 
while acting within transnational networks and furthering seemingly neutral, 
international norms of transparency.97 Significantly, however, TI and its allies 
depart from this broader trend by eschewing the “counterhegemonic” and rights-
focused, left-wing projects that those other networks attempt to further;98 instead, 
the anti-corruption community works with established IFIs and other international 
institutions to further the financial integration of developing nations within global 
capitalism.99 
                                                           
 
95 Steven Sampson, The Anti-Corruption Industry: From Movement to Institution, 11 GLOBAL CRIME 
261, 276–77 (2010). Prominent human rights NGOs with agendas that look beyond anti-corruption, 
such as Amnesty International, have also begun to promote transparency campaigns. TI and AI 
occasionally work together in broader campaigns to end human rights abuses and corruption. See, e.g., 
Middle East and North Africa Can End Legacy of Human Rights Abuse and Corruption, AMNESTY 
INT’L (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/middle-east-and-north-
africa-can-end-legacy-human-rights-abuse-and-corrupti (joint announcement by AI and TI calling for 
new governments coalescing after the so-called Arab Spring to establish, among other things, “processes 
for consultation and access to information that allow human rights activists and all other civil society 
actors to participate fully and without fear in the building of systems and institutions of government”). 
96 MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 2 (1998). 
97 See SIDNEY TARROW, THE NEW TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM 28–29 (2005). 
98 See Peter Evans, Counterhegemonic Globalization: Transnational Social Movements in the 
Contemporary Global Political Economy, in THE HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY: STATES, CIVIL 
SOCIETIES, AND GLOBALIZATION 655, 656–58 (Thomas Janoski et al. eds., 2005); Philip McMichael, 
Globalization, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, supra, at 587, 588–90. These 
counterhegemonic movements have themselves been subject to important critiques from the left. See, 
e.g., Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-related Violence 
in Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2009) (critiquing the international 
feminist movement); David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the 
Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 109–10 (2002) (critiquing international human rights 
organizations); Kelly Rittich, Global Labour Policy as Global Social Policy, 14 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 
227 (2008) (critiquing international labor organizations). 
99 In this regard, the anti-corruption movement is decidedly not a “social movement” that would fall 
within the sociological subfield that studies such movements—it is far more top-down than bottom-up, 
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A. “Transparency” in Transparency International 
TI was founded in 1993 under the leadership of former World Bank executive 
Peter Eigen and thus was one of the first and most prominent non-governmental 
members of the anti-corruption movement.100 It has expanded to include nearly one 
hundred accredited national chapters that lobby and pressure public decision-
makers in the many countries in which it operates to adopt corruption control 
instruments.101 Lacking the power or leverage that international and regional 
governing bodies—like the UN or the Organization of American States, and IFIs, 
like the World Bank and IMF—enjoy, TI tries to use its professional networks and 
moral authority to build coalitions among government, private-sector, and civil-
society institutions.102 In its overarching policy platform, TI prescribes a portfolio 
of legal and structural measures that extend well beyond forcing the state to 
disclose information to the public.103 These strategies include using the 
                                                                                                                                      
 
as its institutional relationship with the World Bank, see text accompanying supra note 94, 
demonstrates. See Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of 
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 806–07 n.2 (2008) (parsing definitions and noting that the 
term transnational advocacy network is generally identified predominantly with “professionalized NGO 
advocacy”); Michael McCann, Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives, 2 ANN. REV. 
L. & SOC. SCI. 17, 23–24 (2006) (providing literature review of social movement theory and identifying 
among its many themes a focus on movements led by and representing “nonelites whose social position 
reflects relatively low degrees of wealth, prestige, or political clout” and a use of disruptive protests and 
other tactics “that halt or upset ongoing social practices”). 
100 Galtung & Pope, supra note 91, at 258. TI’s founding coincided with, and helped spur, the 
development in the mid- to late-1990s of an international consensus among IFIs and other state and non-
state entities to view corruption as a preeminent obstruction to economic development. See James Thuo 
Gathii, Defining the Relationship Between Human Rights and Corruption, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 125, 
144–45 (2009). It also coincided with the beginning of a period in the history of NGOs in which NGOs 
were increasingly active and influential in international policymaking. See Steve Charnovitz, Two 
Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 265–68 
(1997). 
101 Galtung & Pope, supra note 91, at 260; de Sousa & Larmour, supra note 91, at 270, 273–77; Luís de 
Sousa, TI in Search of a Constituency: The Institutionalization and Franchising of the Global Anti-
Corruption Doctrine, in GOVERNMENTS, NGOS AND ANTI-CORRUPTION: THE NEW INTEGRITY 
WARRIORS 186, 194–96 (Luís de Sousa, Peter Larmour & Barry Hindess eds., 2009). 
102 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight 
Against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S141, S165–66 (2002); Peter Eigen, Measuring and Combating 
Corruption, 5 J. POL’Y REF. 187, 190 (2002); A Statement of Vision, Values and Guiding Principles for 
Transparency International, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.transparency.org/ 
whoweare/accountability/a_statement_of_vision_values_and_guiding_principles_for_ti/2/. 
103 The anti-corruption movement of which TI is a part intersects with broader international movements 
promoting good governance, democracy promotion, economic development, and state building. Steven 
Sampson, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Southeast Europe: Landscapes and Sites, in 
GOVERNMENTS, NGOS AND ANTI-CORRUPTION, supra note 101, at 170. 
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organization’s institutional structures, which produce research and model reforms 
and build networks among states, IFIs, and other NGOs, to lobby and pressure for 
various reforms. TI and the broader anti-corruption movement encourage states to 
enact and enforce ethical standards among officials and corporations contracting 
with governments, to offer higher salaries to government employees, to privatize 
state-owned enterprises and services, and to enact laws and develop norms that 
promote transparency and thereby bring corrupt practices to light.104 
With the prominent position that it plays in the name of one of the most 
widely recognized anti-corruption NGOs, transparency enjoys special status among 
the package of good-government reforms that the movement promotes.105 TI 
advocates on transparency’s behalf both by lobbying for rights-based legal reforms 
(whether at the national level or via the enforcement of international conventions) 
and by collecting and distributing information about government performance. As 
it states on its website, 
Transparency International supports the international efforts to have the right of 
access to information recognised and respected. The exercise of this right 
enables citizens to keep their governments and public bodies accountable. This 
can hinder corrupt practices that benefit from opaque or obscure regimes.106 
TI also collects and publicizes information about corrupt practices, most 
prominently in its Corruption Perception Index (CPI).107 The CPI is an “aggregate 
indicator” that uses assessments and business opinion surveys to gauge the extent 
of a nation’s corruption and the extent of its anti-corruption efforts in the public 
                                                           
 
104 Ed Brown & Jonathan Cloke, Neoliberal Reform, Governance and Corruption in the South: 
Assessing the International Anti-Corruption Crusade, 36 ANTIPODE 272, 275–77 (2004); Galtung & 
Pope, supra note 91, at 261–74. 
105 See Margaret Hanson, The Global Promotion of Transparency in Emerging Markets, 9 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 63, 66–68 (2003). To its great credit, TI also has also attempted aggressively to disclose 
the sources of their own funding—a practice that other transparency-focused NGOs have adopted. See 
Frequently Asked Questions about Transparency International, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http:// 
www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_transparency_international/2/ (last visited 
July 15, 2012) (explaining how TI is funded and how its national chapters are financed independently); 
see also How We Are Funded, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org/ 
about/funding (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). 
106 The Role of Information in Fighting Corruption, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://archive 
.transparency.org/global_priorities/access_information (last visited July 15, 2012). 
107 For a list and description of TI’s full range of reports, see Publications, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publications/ (last visited July 15, 2012). 
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sector. It then scores each nation on a ten-point scale that allows comparisons 
across countries.108 It has become TI’s signature product and a key element of its 
brand identity.109 TI’s approach has served as a model for new entrants in the anti-
corruption field, which use similar approaches to protect developing nations from 
corrupt practices in the extractive industries (where corruption is often endemic)110 
or to offer an index of laws and government practices that competes with and 
complements TI’s CPI.111 
If the anti-corruption industry adapts, at least in part, a traditional rights-based 
strategy for opening government, its focus on the economic and political effects of 
corruption distinguishes its understanding and use of transparency as an issue. The 
industry views NGO-produced measures that force disclosure on state actors—like 
the other good-governance measures that it advocates—as a means to make a 
nation’s government more ethical, its markets more efficient, and its economy 
more robust. It thereby reverses the FOI movement’s assumptions about 
transparency’s primacy in democratic theory and practice: rather than 
understanding law as a means to make the state transparent and therefore more 
democratic (with the help of the private press), the anti-corruption movement views 
transparency and the international NGOs that define and enforce it as the means to 
reach an economic and administrative goal—the end of official corruption—that 
will ultimately reform a nation’s political system. Although its name has played a 
                                                           
 
108 Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/policy_ 
research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results (2010). 
109 See Staffan Andersson & Paul M. Heywood, The Politics of Perception: Use and Abuse of 
Transparency International’s Approach to Measuring Corruption, 57 POL. STUD. 746, 747 (2009). 
110 The most prominent extractive-industry NGOs are the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 
founded in 2002 and funded by the private sector, supporting countries, civil-society organizations, and 
its host government, Norway, and Publish What You Pay, also founded in 2002 and formed and initially 
funded by NGOs and foundations. See EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2011); PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY, http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org (last visited 
July 15, 2012). Their campaigns attempt to force companies to, as the name states, “publish what [they] 
pay” for the right to extract, in order to make such transactions more transparent. 
111 A recent entrant in the field is Global Integrity (GI), begun in 1999 within the Center for Public 
Integrity (a U.S. domestic investigative journalism NGO) and then spinning off independently in 2005, 
with a mission to “play a catalytic role in promoting accountability and transparency reforms by 
developing tools that address the needs of the public, private, and civil sectors equally.” Global 
Integrity’s Mission, GLOBAL INTEGRITY, http://www.globalintegrity.org/about/mission (last visited 
July 15, 2012). Rather than studying perceptions of corruption like TI, GI assesses anti-corruption 
mechanisms, openness, and government accountability to understand not what it describes as the 
“disease of corruption” but “the medication applied against it: the public policies, institutions, and 
practices that deter, prevent, or punish corruption.” Our Story, GLOBAL INTEGRITY, 
http://www.globalintegrity.org/about/story (last visited July 15, 2012). 
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key role in the emergence of “transparency” as the term that signifies open 
government, TI neither seeks transparency for its own democratic sake nor 
privileges it as the most important tool on the role to a legitimate state. Instead, TI 
promotes the consequential value of openness as a means to fight corruption. 
B. The Contestable Claims of the Institutional Anti-Corruption 
Fix 
TI’s fight against corruption and on transparency’s behalf has not gone 
unchallenged. Critics argue that despite its seemingly precise, quantitative, and 
unambiguous calculation of corruption, TI’s CPI relies on imprecise perceptions 
and flawed sampling and survey methodologies.112 They also claim that the 
anticorruption movement furthers Western, technocratic conceptions of governance 
and a neoliberal vision of a minimal state;113 as applied in the nations that the CPI 
identifies as suffering from corruption, anti-corruption programs shrink the size of 
government and limit its functions while expanding institutional and legal 
accountability regimes.114 In the process, seemingly universal ideals of a good 
government, developed and promoted by Western NGOs funded by Western 
governments and foundations,115 are imposed on distinct political, economic, and 
social systems of individual nations. These prescriptions prioritize “good 
government” over popular democracy and effective, legitimate policy for the entire 
                                                           
 
112 The CPI’s seeming precision in reducing a complex phenomenon to an ordinal rating is a key feature 
that helps win it media attention when TI releases it annually. See de Sousa & Larmour, supra note 91, 
at 277–78. For criticisms of the CPI, see Andersson & Heywood, supra note 109, at 752–54; 
CHRISTIANE ARNDT & CHARLES OMAN, OECD DEV. CTR., USES AND ABUSES OF GOVERNANCE 
INDICATORS 91–92 (2006). Critics of the extractive industries similarly charge that indices such as that 
produced by the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative enable mining and oil companies to appear 
ethical while they seek additional rents from resource-rich nations and hide profits through corporate 
subsidiaries and tax havens. See NNIMMO BASSEY, TO COOK A CONTINENT: DESTRUCTIVE EXTRACTION 
AND CLIMATE CRISIS IN AFRICA 35–39 (2011); Khadija Sharife, “Transparency” Hides Zambia’s Lost 
Billions, AL JAZEERA ENG. (June 18, 2011, 3:43 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/ 
2011/06/20116188244589715.html. 
113 For a broader critique of NGOs’ role in promoting a neo-liberal globalization, see JEAN-FRANÇOIS 
BAYART, GLOBAL SUBJECTS: A POLITICAL CRITIQUE OF GLOBALIZATION 58–67 (2007). 
114 TI’s rise has run concurrently with the rise of New Public Management (also known as New 
Governance), whose emphasis on accountability has proven especially attractive to the diverse political 
interests that advocate for public fiscal restraint, particularly in the provision of public services. See 
MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION 43–44 (1997). 
115 See Frequently Asked Questions About TI, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://transparency.org/news_ 
room/faq/faq_ti (“The bulk of TI’s income comes from government development agency budgets and 
foundations. Other sources of income include project funds from international organisations, donations 
from private sector companies and income from honoraria and publications.”). 
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nation, while the pursuit of these ideals limits the range of political issues that 
voters and their elected representatives can decide.116 The CPI thus acts as a 
disciplining technology, one whose seeming, but imperfect, neutrality and basis in 
the administrative norm of transparency constitutes a form of unelected “organized 
governance” on states and their agencies while it hides its more normative, 
programmatic functions.117 Representing ideas developed elsewhere, and wielding 
powerful, seemingly objective indices to advocate for government reform, TI and 
international anti-corruption advocates appear unaccountable to local citizens and 
publics—even as they would claim to be furthering the crucial political and public 
goal of fighting official corruption.118 
TI responds to such critiques by arguing that ending the easy cases of clear 
corruption (e.g., the official with the Swiss bank account) are the main, 
                                                           
 
116 See Brown & Cloke, supra note 104, at 285; Staffan Andersson & Paul M. Heywood, Anti-
Corruption as a Risk to Democracy: On the Unintended Consequences of International Anti-Corruption 
Campaigns, in GOVERNMENTS, NGOS AND ANTI-CORRUPTION, supra note 98, at 33–34; Barry Hindess, 
Good Government and Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION 1, 5–7 (Peter Larmour & 
Nick Wolanin eds., 2001); Barry Hindess, International Anti-Corruption as a Programme of 
Normalization, in GOVERNMENTS, NGOS AND ANTI-CORRUPTION, supra note 101, at 19–32 [hereinafter 
Hindess, Normalization]; Peter Larmour, Corruption and the Concept of “Culture”: Evidence from the 
Pacific Islands, 49 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 225, 237 (2009). For a classic study of the unintended 
negative consequences of imposing anti-corruption reforms, see FRANK ANECHIARICO & JAMES B. 
JACOBS, THE PURSUIT OF ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY: HOW CORRUPTION CONTROL MAKES GOVERNMENT 
INEFFECTIVE (1996). 
117 See Andersson & Heywood, supra note 109; Brown & Cloke, supra note 104; see also JON 
BEASLEY-MURRAY, POSTHEGEMONY: POLITICAL THEORY AND LATIN AMERICA 107–08 (2011) 
(critiquing transparency’s transformative power on the state and society, and its relationship to 
neoliberalism); POWER, supra note 114, at 6–8 (noting the distinction in financial accounting between 
technological, or operational, elements of auditing practices and programmatic, or normative, elements, 
while both problematizing the idea that technology is neutral and noting how its seeming neutrality 
obfuscates the programmatic nature of the practice). For a critique of how seemingly neutral standards 
serve as normative efforts to control behavior and organize governance, see NILS BRUNSSON & BENGT 
JACOBSSON, The Contemporary Expansion of Standardization, in A WORLD OF STANDARDS 1, 10 
(2000); Haridimos Tsoukas, The Tyranny of Light: The Temptations and Paradoxes of the Information 
Society, 29 FUTURES 827, 831 (1997). 
118 For criticism of NGOs as unrepresentative of local populations and unaccountable to national 
political systems, see Kenneth Anderson & David Rieff, “Global Civil Society”: A Sceptical View, in 
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2004/05, at 26, 29–30 (Helmut Anheier et al. eds., 2005); Ruth W. Grant & 
Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 
37–38 (2005); Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the 
“Unregulated” Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957, 963 (1996); see also Steve Charnovitz, 
Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 348, 365–68 (2006) 
(agreeing with Anderson and Rieff in part, but arguing that “more open and inclusive processes of 
decision making can help to overcome the allegedly attenuated democratic legitimacy of international 
governance”). 
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uncontroversial purpose of its work,119 and that it allows its locally situated 
national chapters to define corruption in more difficult cases.120 In other words, 
eradicating clear cases of corruption is not political, and the organization leaves a 
broad array of political and regulatory options open to its locally accountable and 
informed members. But anti-corruption efforts do not simply seek to identify and 
punish wrongdoers; they also advocate, implicitly or explicitly, broader structural 
reforms. And if corruption is defined narrowly as rent-seeking behavior by public 
officials, then privatization and deregulation—reform strategies that can apply in 
any setting—simultaneously reduce the potential for corruption and make the state 
ostensibly more transparent by making it smaller.121 To the extent that TI and the 
anti-corruption movement market these reforms as administrative, technocratic 
improvements provided by independent, non-state institutions, their efforts seem to 
promote neutral, common-sense tools that can transform states into leaner, more 
efficient institutions—states that can both be held accountable to a Western model 
cognizable to NGOs and IFIs and be more attractive to direct foreign investment.122 
These seemingly neutral principles are the very problem that TI represents for its 
critics, who view the NGO as either a witting or unwitting agent of a global 
neoliberal regime that undercuts state sovereignty and local control.123 
“Transparency,” for TI and the anti-corruption movement generally, functions both 
as a transcendent and neutral administrative norm to which all reasonable people 
can subscribe and as the basis for a normative political apparatus that plays a key 
role in the structural readjustment of national political, economic, and 
administrative systems. One need not fully agree with commentators who are 
critical of the anti-corruption movement in order to view the powerful normative 
                                                           
 
119 Frequently Asked Questions About Corruption, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/ 
whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption/2/ (last visited July 21, 2012). 
120 Id. 
121 Brown & Cloke, supra note 104, at 286–87. 
122 Hanson, supra note 105, at 63; Hindess, Normalization, supra note 116, at 23; Mark Philp, Modelling 
Political Corruption in Transition, in DIMENSIONEN POLITISCHER KORRUPTION: BEITRAGE ZUM 
STAND DER INTERNATIONALEN FORSCHUNG 91, 96 (2005). 
123 On transparency’s relationship to global neoliberalism, see ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, GLOBALIZATION: 
THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES 29–33 (1998) (characterizing the expert imposition of transparency as a 
means to ease administration over differentiated, local cultures); Christina Garsten & Monica Lindh de 
Montoya, The Naked Corporation: Visualization, Veiling and the Ethico-Politics of Organizational 
Transparency, in TRANSPARENCY IN A NEW GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 15, at 79, 90–91 (describing 
transparency as a seemingly moral, apolitical means to “mak[e] the globalizing world hospitable for 
trans-organizational, transnational and sometimes super-national interventions and administrative 
procedures”). 
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role that the movement plays in the political economy of good governance reforms 
that are promoted, sometimes coercively, by international institutions. 
C. Conclusion: The Limits of the Institutional Anti-Corruption 
Fix 
An open, visible state is one aspect, albeit a key one, in TI’s broader critique 
of governing regimes around the world and its normative vision for a leaner, more 
accountable, and efficient state. The problem TI and the broader movement 
principally address is corruption, not a democratic deficit created and fostered by 
official secrecy or a political right that the state is ignoring or under-enforcing. 
They pursue reform as a means to extend the larger structural, historical change of 
which they are a part: the expansion and movement of global capital and finance to 
fund economic development as it is understood and championed by Western states. 
TI and its institutional colleagues thus hold a primarily consequentialist vision of 
transparency, one in which transparency’s democratic effects flow from better, 
non-corrupt governance rather than from the enforcement of the public’s right of 
access to information as such.124 
It is a vision whose suspicion about the state and law are more pronounced 
than in the earlier FOI movement. If the state is corrupt, it will not enact laws to 
force itself to disclose information, and if the corrupt state has such laws, it will 
under-enforce them. Like other transnational NGOs, TI thus attempts to work 
around the state by helping to construct an institutional network of organizations 
that can force the state to disclose information125 and affect international law and 
norms.126 With its international organization and national chapters, as well as its 
relationships with influential IFIs, developed nations, and private firms, TI relies 
for reform on a far more complex set of institutional actors than the administrative 
procedures and judicial review that the traditional FOI movement envisions. 
Furthermore, its reliance upon local chapters recognizes that its program will vary 
in different countries, based on local political, legal, and institutional conditions. TI 
thus hopes to further a transnational ideal of non-corrupt governance without 
necessarily seeking to impose a transcendent legal right of public access to 
                                                           
 
124 On consequentialist arguments in transparency’s favor, see Fenster, supra note 3, at 899–902. 
125 This process, in which local activists whose work is blocked by the state seek assistance from 
international NGOs whose headquarters are elsewhere to provide external pressure, is referred to as the 
“boomerang” effect in the literature on transnational activism. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 96, at 
12–13; TARROW, supra note 97, at 145–46. 
126 See Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 
348, 361–63 (2006). 
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information—the ideal of a constitutional and human right that should allow no 
national variance. 
These distinctions reflect the quite different historical context from which the 
anti-corruption movement emerged. The Cold War had ended by the time TI began, 
removing world communism as the main threat to the developing world and 
reshaping the bipolar geopolitics that the West and East had seemed to inhabit. But 
corruption serves an analogous role to TI in post-communist, failed, and 
developing states as the Soviet threat did to ASNE and free press advocates 
focused on the immediate post-war world. Economic development has replaced 
democratic development as the preeminent concern, and administration and 
governance that can attract foreign capital and IFI loans and investment serve the 
role that legal informational rights and a free press played and continue to play for 
the FOI movement. 
III. THE TECHNOLOGICAL FIX: DIGITAL TRANSPARENCY 
FOI advocates view government information asymmetry and hoarding 
primarily as creating state secrecy and as correctable with a legal solution. TI and 
other anti-corruption advocates view the same problem as a largely administrative 
one caused by official corruption, which an institutional solution can solve. Digital-
transparency advocates view the same problem primarily as one of the flow and 
accessibility of data, which can be solved through information technology. In their 
solution, code and networked communication substitute for or augment the legal 
rights and duties that officials routinely ignore and courts insufficiently enforce, 
effectively and efficiently moving government information from hard drives and 
other storage media to the public. Reframing the problem that transparency must 
solve from law to code leads digital advocates to prescribe a smaller role for the 
state (as well as for the institutional press) than the earlier advocacy movement and 
a much larger role for an active, participatory citizenry and an entrepreneurial class 
of visionaries and software designers. Although some digital-transparency NGOs 
attempt to further the more traditional aims of the FOI movement,127 the 
                                                           
 
127 The Sunlight Foundation, for example, has established a wide range of online programs that overlap 
with traditional freedom of information and campaign finance disclosure laws, and is focused especially 
on making congressional operations more visible via the Internet. See Issues by Topic, SUNLIGHT 
FOUND., http://sunlightfoundation.com/about/issues/ (last visited July 21, 2012) (listing the projects it is 
pursuing, which includes disclosing congressional earmarks, participating in the FOI campaign’s 
Sunshine Week and Freedom of Information Day, and attempting to increase the transparency of 
lobbyists’ influence); see also Schacter, supra note 18, at 651 (discussing Sunlight Foundation 
programs). Micah Sifry, co-founder of the Personal Democracy Forum, similarly views at least part of 
the NGO’s purpose as using digital information and networking technology to take advantage of and 
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movement’s innovation lies in its distinct efforts to free government data and allow 
information to move freely between state and public. 
A. Digital Transparency and the Technological Transformation 
of State and Public 
The rhetoric that digital-technology advocates deploy is remarkably powerful, 
continuing a tradition established in the writings that heralded the emergence of 
cyberspace.128 The foremost collection advocating this position, entitled Open 
Government: Collaboration, Transparency, and Participation in Practice (2010) 
and issued by the technology book publisher O’Reilly,129 includes essays 
proclaiming that the revolutionary changes wrought by information technology can 
tame and make usable the data collected and produced by sprawling government 
bureaucracies. The book’s contributors provide a representative sampling of the 
movement’s composition and leadership: NGO executives and staff, 
entrepreneurial software programmers as well as executives and in-house 
intellectuals at Microsoft and IBM, academics (both faculty and enterprising 
students), consultants, and several government officials from federal agencies and 
congressional staff as well as from state and local government. The Internet, the 
book’s foreword states, can and will produce a state that 
opens its doors to the world; co-innovates with everyone, especially citizens; 
shares resources that were previously closely guarded; harnesses the power of 
mass collaboration; drives transparency throughout its operations; and behaves 
                                                                                                                                      
 
further the spirit of FOI laws. See MICAH L. SIFRY, WIKILEAKS AND THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY 105–
34 (2011). 
128 See generally PATRICE FLICHY, THE INTERNET IMAGINAIRE (2007) (documenting the utopian claims 
made on the Internet’s behalf, especially in the early 1990s); FRED TURNER, FROM COUNTERCULTURE 
TO CYBERCULTURE 249–62 (2005) (providing an intellectual history of the utopian claims about 
cyberspace and the Internet); Philip Agre, The Market Logic of Information, 13 KNOWLEDGE, TECH. & 
POL’Y 67 (2000); Richard Barbrook & Andy Cameron, The Californian Ideology, 6 SCI. AS CULTURE 
44, 67 (1996) (offering a relatively early critique of cyber-utopianism); Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace 
As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 215–19 (2007) (summarizing the utopian strain in cyberspace 
advocacy). The classic example is John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84, 
89, 129 (reiterating, explaining, and making famous Stewart Brand’s claim that “information wants to 
be free,” and predicting that “[t]he [intellectual property] protections that we will develop will rely far 
more on ethics and technology than on law”). 
129 OPEN GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION, TRANSPARENCY, AND PARTICIPATION IN PRACTICE (Daniel 
Lathrop & Laurel Ruma eds., 2010) [hereinafter OPEN GOVERNMENT]. 
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not as an isolated department or jurisdiction, but as something new—a truly 
integrated and networked organization.130 
This new state will surely be leaner and more efficient; moreover, as it “co-
innovates,” “shares resources,” collaborates, “drives transparency,” integrates, and 
networks, it will also act in a less hidebound, formally bureaucratic way. 
Such ideals suggest administrative and technical commitments that parallel 
the open source code movement. In his key chapter in the aforementioned digital-
transparency book (published by the company he founded), Tim O’Reilly offers a 
series of “lessons” from the open source community and technology industry that 
he argues apply directly to government: use open, simple programming standards; 
design information technology to foster participation; and enable end users to mine 
and aggregate data the state collects.131 “Just as open source software allows users 
to change and contribute to the source code of their software,” the book’s editors 
note in its preface, “open government now means government where citizens not 
only have access to information, documents, and proceedings, but can also become 
participants in a meaningful way.”132 The technology and process of open source, 
advocates argue, will increase the state’s visibility and ability to collaborate with 
the public.133 Its ability to evoke among technophiles technical competence, open 
design, and collaborative process also allows “open source” to serve as the key 
metaphor among popular political theorists who deploy it in such concepts as 
“open-source democracy,”134 “open-source politics,”135 and “next generation 
democracy.”136 
                                                           
 
130 Don Tapscott, Foreword to OPEN GOVERNMENT, supra note 129, at xvi. 
131 Tim O’Reilly, Government as Platform, in OPEN GOVERNMENT, supra note 129, at 11, 15–24, 32–34. 
132 Daniel Lathrop & Laurel Ruma, Preface to OPEN GOVERNMENT, supra note 129, at xix, xix. 
133 Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355, 371–87; cf. LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 153 (2006) (“[Open code] functions as a kind of Freedom of Information 
Act for network regulation. As with ordinary law, open code requires that lawmaking be public, and 
thus that lawmaking be transparent.”). 
134 See DOUGLAS RUSHKOFF, OPEN SOURCE DEMOCRACY: HOW ONLINE COMMUNICATION IS 
CHANGING OFFLINE POLITICS (2003), available at http://www.gutenberg.org/catalog/world/ 
readfile?fk_files=1477887. 
135 See Micah Sifry, The Rise of Open-Source Politics, NATION, Nov. 4, 2004, at 14, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/article/rise-open-source-politics. 
136 See JARED DUVAL, NEXT GENERATION DEMOCRACY: WHAT THE OPEN-SOURCE REVOLUTION 
MEANS FOR POWER, POLITICS, AND CHANGE (2010). 
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That degree of productivity and enthusiasm about newly emergent 
technological possibilities brims over in events like TransparencyCamp, an annual 
event held outside Washington, D.C., where “government officials, technologists, 
journalists and advocates [come together] to share their knowledge about how best 
to use new technologies and policies to make our government really work for the 
people.”137 A project of the Sunlight Foundation, a leading digital-transparency 
NGO, the Camp’s 2011 “unconference” was sponsored by Microsoft (on whose 
Maryland campus the event was held), Google, O’Reilly Publishing, Governing 
magazine, Adobe, and Forum One Communications (a “digital communications 
firm” that develops internet strategies for, among others, NGOs and government 
agencies).138 Scheduled sessions in 2011 included varied topics like “Building an 
Open Financial Datamart,” “Breaking the Information Cartel in Congress,” and 
“Open Data in Municipal Government for Fun and Profit.”139 As one activist 
described it in a video posted on the Sunlight Foundation website, “It’s a beautiful 
citizen uprising, but it’s not an uprising which says we’ve come here to destroy or 
tear you down, it’s an uprising that says we’ve come here to help you be more 
efficient.”140 Led by young activists and visionary officials, the TransparencyCamp 
“uprising” is built upon and via the hardware, software, and search engines of its 
eminent corporate sponsors. 
Coupling rhetorical verve with organizational energy, digital-transparency 
advocates posit that the state and public can engage in ongoing, two-way 
communication—a much broader and bolder vision than the FOI movement’s more 
restrained idea that the public’s right to know will increase government 
accountability and improve bureaucratic performance. Before, “information” 
needed to be “freed” to the public via the press; now, as usable data, it can, must, 
and will flow freely and cheaply in all directions, using technology that allows two-
way access to the state.141 Data running freely can move from the state as well as to 
                                                           
 
137 About Transparency Camp, TRANSPARENCY CAMP, http://transparencycamp.org/ (last visited Nov. 9, 
2011); Sponsors, TRANSPARENCY CAMP, http://transparencycamp.org/sponsors/ (last visited Nov. 9, 
2011). 
138 Sponsors, supra note 137. 
139 Schedule, TRANSPARENCY CAMP, http://transparencycamp.org/sessions/ (last visited July 21, 2012). 
140 TransparencyCamp 2011, video embedded in Laurenellen McCann, TCamp: Looking Back and 
Looking Forward, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (May 12, 2011, 1:18 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/ 
blog/2011/05/12/tcamp-looking-back-and-looking-forward/. 
141 See, e.g., BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI GOVERNMENT: HOW TECHNOLOGY CAN MAKE 
GOVERNMENT BETTER, DEMOCRACY STRONGER, AND CITIZENS MORE POWERFUL, at xii–xiii (2009) 
(characterizing the ideal of “open government” as concerning both data access and collaboration with 
the public). 
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it; the public can both pull information from the state and push data and opinions to 
it. A digital world thus should enable unmediated, interactive communication 
between state and citizens, an ideal that digital technology NGOs like the Sunlight 
Foundation and the Personal Democracy Forum embrace.142 
Digital transparency’s ideals dovetail with, and could even advance, the main 
administrative reform movements of the past several decades.143 Like the 
deregulatory “new public management” movement,144 digital transparency 
imagines citizens as consumers who can use government data to make better 
market decisions, and views private entities as capable of improving upon or 
replacing state-created public goods and services.145 Similarly, in its effort to have 
government collaborate with private citizens and institutions in designing 
regulatory programs and public-service provisions,146 digital transparency also 
parallels and incorporates “new governance” ideals.147 
                                                           
 
142 See, e.g., SIFRY, supra note 127, at 15–17 (editor and curator of the Personal Democracy Forum, 
praising the “Age of Transparency” in an era of networked communication, in which social media and 
so-called “crowd–sourced” information are viewed as inexorably changing the shape of the government 
and its relationship to its citizens); Sunlight Agenda 2011, SUNLIGHT FOUND., http:// 
sunlightfoundation.com/policy/documents/agenda/ (last visited July 21, 2012) (“Today, our newly 
networked citizenry has rising expectations of greatly expanded access to governmental information, so 
that it may play a fuller role in understanding, evaluating and participating in the workings of its 
government. More open and transparent government can foster more competent and trustworthy 
behavior by public officials along with a more engaged public.”). 
143 See generally Jennifer Shkabatur, Cities @ Crossroads: Digital Technology and Local Democracy in 
America, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1413, 1443–64 (2011). 
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Government administrations have incorporated the movement’s ideas into 
their practices. President Barack Obama announced soon after his January 2009 
inauguration an Open Government Initiative (OGI)148 whose implementation, 
announced in December 2009 by Office of Management and Budget Director Peter 
Orszag, sought to promote “[t]he three principles of transparency, participation, 
and collaboration [that] form the cornerstone of an open government” through 
specific policies that each federal agency would implement.149 Beth Noveck, a 
high-profile academic advocate for digital transparency, served a key role in 
developing and implementing the OGI. In a blog post she co-authored on the White 
House’s OGI blog the day after Orszag issued his memo, she promoted open 
government as a means to foster “collaboration between government, private 
industry, and the public to improve the lives of Americans in their communities,” 
and touted the administration’s early efforts to make data available to the public 
about emergency first responders and nutrition, and to businesses and entrepreneurs 
about publicly-funded technologies and patents.150 In a later interview, Noveck 
went so far as to disavow the use of the term “open government” as a moniker for 
the Obama administration’s program; instead, she explained, it should have been 
named as it was conceived—as a collaborative, “wiki”-like recasting of the state’s 
informational relationship with its citizens.151 The OGI, in short, would do more 
than simply open the government in a traditional manner—it would implement new 
governance at the federal level. 
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Digital transparency’s promise and application are on even clearer display in 
those American municipalities that have aggressively adopted information 
technologies to make their data available.152 A number of larger cities with strong 
software development industries have encouraged the use of their data for 
development by private firms153—indeed, the City of New York and its 
Metropolitan Transit Authority have even sponsored contests with cash prizes for 
software developers to create apps using government data sets.154 New York has 
created the position of Chief Digital Officer whose job is to “improv[e] 
communication with residents and businesses by enhancing government 
transparency and working closely with digital media.”155 Such positions, as well as 
more senior positions of municipal information or technology officer, have been 
given new responsibilities to encourage communication and collaboration with the 
public through web portals and social media.156 In the first months of her tenure as 
New York’s Chief Digital Officer, Rachel Sterne discussed with technology 
companies “ways to use their platforms to showcase the work of city agencies” and 
unveiled The Daily Pothole, a blog that reports on street repairs.157 Filling potholes 
is not the only local-government service that information technology can assist. 
Drivers in some cities can use applications on their smart phones to learn of 
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available parking spots, for example, while the cities, in turn, can use the data 
collected about the demand for parking on certain streets and in certain 
neighborhoods to set variable pricing.158 Perhaps unsurprisingly, San Francisco 
appears to be in the lead in municipal digital transparency as a matter of practice 
and law: not only does it boast DataSF, a web portal that serves as a clearinghouse 
for its data sets,159 but it is also the first city to enact an open-data ordinance 
requiring city departments to make their data sets available to the public.160 
Digital-transparency advocates thus promise more than simply a reformed 
state. At their most exuberant, they assert that online collaboration and data flows 
between public and private parties can shrink the state, if not make it wither away 
altogether.161 An “open civic system” carried over and through public and private 
networks allows everyone, from app designers to the wisest of crowds, to solve the 
problems that bureaucrats formerly struggled with behind the government’s closed 
doors.162 In the traditional, modern technocratic conception, government agencies 
and officials merely gather, organize, and release information. But now, Tim 
O’Reilly argues, the state should no longer be viewed as the “first mover of civic 
action” but instead as a “platform” and “the manager of a marketplace” for private 
and government interaction.163 It might continue to provide key public services, but 
in doing so it must gather and release data about its performance; it can be involved 
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in the creation of public goods, but only by building or initiating capital-intensive 
infrastructure (like information highways) that are unlikely to be provided in 
sufficient quantities by the market.164 Then the state must get out of the way, 
serving only as a conduit of information by which individual entrepreneurs can 
make government data available and useful via the web,165 bloggers and websites 
can “crowdsource” government data to make sense out of it,166 and software 
designers can “mash-up” government information in order to make it more user-
friendly for mobile computing devices like smart phones.167 In its collaborative and 
shrunken guises, the transformed state will serve as an adjunct to market activity 
that exists only to distribute information as a public good and to stimulate private 
economic and civic development.168 
Significant by its absence in this conception is government’s more traditional, 
broader police-power authority to enforce laws and promulgate and enforce 
regulations, as well as its role in redistributing wealth. The digital state provides 
services and information; it eschews coercion and paternalism in favor of 
collaboration and negotiation.169 Whereas the traditional FOI approach seeks to 
open a window onto state activity, allowing the public to peer in, digital 
transparency offers to plug the state into existing data flows, connecting 
government, reconceived largely as a data repository, into part of a seamless web 
of information.170 The FOI and anti-corruption movements seek to reform the state 
and its practices by opening them to public view; digital transparency promises to 
transform the state by redefining its role within a networked economy and society. 
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Alongside information technology’s promise to transform the state is the 
related assumption that technology will transform the public by expanding citizens’ 
ability to receive data from the state and push data to it. In the digital present, 
citizens can finally act as informed users of government services and active 
participants in democratic politics. The blogger and journalist Jeff Jarvis imagines a 
world in which everyone creates “personal political pages” where they discuss their 
own beliefs and commitments, “manage” their “relationship” with politicians and 
government officials, and have their pages aggregated by Google (“the polling 
place that never closes”). This, in turn, will allow activist networks to form and 
participate more effectively in politics and government.171 For Yochai Benkler, the 
networked information environment has produced “a cultural shift in self-
perception, from passive couch potato to active participant in collaborative 
practices for making one’s own information universe, [which] opens the 
opportunity for a more robust, sustainable level of involvement by citizens in the 
governance of their society.”172 Plugged into the informational network, the state is 
now available in unmediated form for contemporary citizens who are no longer 
dependent upon the commercial press’ institutional gate-keeping role. Private 
websites can sort, organize, and make data useful for the public,173 first in the 
shadow of and perhaps ultimately in the absence of any authoritative press that 
collects information and educates the public. Indeed, a more competitive market of 
entrepreneurial data managers, programmers, website authors, and crowdsourcing 
masses can mash up and process information that the public finds more useful to its 
needs and preferences. Digital transparency promises a future that can develop 
participatory, collaborative, and inquisitive “netizens” who are capable of self-rule 
out of the bored, passive, and cynical apolitical masses who only imagine they 
ruled the opaque state of the twentieth century. 
B. The Limits of the Technological Fix 
Digital transparency builds on a number of contested assumptions about 
information’s direct effects.174 Information technology’s advocates have long 
envisioned a technological sublime: “Every important new technology,” Philip 
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Agre explained, “creates an imaginative vacuum, and time and again this is the sort 
of thing that flows into it: tropes of transcendental escape, utopian perfection, 
discontinuous change, communitarian intimacy, everlasting peace, and boundless 
prosperity.”175 Following this long-established tradition, digital transparency 
heralds information technology as the cure to our opaque, bloated state and 
disinterested, alienated masses. Notwithstanding the movement’s noteworthy 
successes at the federal and local levels, however, it is unclear precisely how the 
state and public have been or will soon be transformed by the technological and 
administrative revolution advocates forecast. Information’s fast and cheap 
distribution in digital form does not necessarily translate into egalitarianism and 
democracy, civic-mindedness and wealth creation, or knowledge and 
understanding.176 No doubt many technologically savvy users of government 
services are willing and able to take advantage of new data flows to enhance their 
lives and gain knowledge that informs their voting and political participation, but 
studies to date have tended to show that use patterns of online government 
resources reflect age, class, and educational differences, and that the heaviest users 
are the youngest, wealthiest, and most educated.177 Furthermore, while it is unclear 
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whether the public is incrementally more informed about government and its 
performance than in the pre-digital era, dissatisfaction with the state appears to run 
at least as high as in analog times. The wired general public has not (yet, at least) 
been transformed into the satisfied, enlightened, collaborative polis that digital 
transparency promises. 
Nor is it clear that information technology can tame the institutional 
complexity and bureaucratic resistance that complicate efforts to reveal the state to 
the public. The modern state, for good and bad reasons, is composed of multiple, 
overlapping organizational layers that extend within and across jurisdictions and 
space;178 smoothing out its striated institutions will require more than imagining it 
as a data repository and single entity capable of open collaboration and then 
offering a technological fix through access to government data and open source 
code.179 Again, there is no doubt that governments, NGOs, and commercial entities 
have made great inroads into making government information available and useful, 
but one would be hard-pressed at present to conclude that these effects have created 
a new form of government or new age of governance. The Obama administration’s 
efforts illustrate this well: the very digital advocates who cheered the 
announcement of its OGI have complained that its changes have been incremental 
rather than revolutionary and that its implementation has frequently been 
disappointing.180 Perhaps the disappointing results have come from a failure of 
administrative will or strategy, or demonstrate the entrenchment of existing 
practices, or the necessary resources were not available, or digital transparency 
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became a lower priority as the administration faced more difficult and important 
challenges; perhaps it was never intended to be an especially high priority. For 
whatever reason, digital transparency has not proven its inevitable triumph over the 
federal bureaucracy, even within an administration and program that appeared so 
promising. At the same time, the Obama administration’s achievements are 
fragile—in the present the OGI relies on the current administration’s willingness to 
invest human and capital resources on its development, and it may be abandoned or 
reduced by future presidents.181 Put simply, the digital-transparency revolution, 
should it occur, will be a consequence of both policy and politics. It will continue 
to be subject to these very human, imperfect processes, rather than bloom 
inexorably through some ahistorical, sublime technological force. 
C. Conclusion 
Digital-transparency advocates claim that the revolution in information 
technology has already freed and will only further free the state’s data to the public, 
for whom it will be packaged by public entities, private entrepreneurs, and wise, 
wired crowds so that it can be available for everyday use, political action, and 
commercial advantage. The basic logic underlying this process parallels those 
described in the rights-based FOI movement and the contemporary digital 
movement: the state is a repository of information (recast now as data) that must be 
freed from its clutches and made available to the public, although by means of code 
and bits rather than law; and once information (or data) is made “free” (or flows 
through a network), it will necessarily have transformative, positive effects on 
politics and society.182 In this regard, they both share civic ideals that date back at 
least to the Progressive Era, when to be a good citizen required one to be well 
informed.183 The happy ending that digital transparency’s policy story offers also 
parallels Transparency International’s prescription: that the transparent 
administrative state will operate more efficiently and inspire the development of 
new markets for investment and widespread economic development. 
Nevertheless, digital transparency relies on a quite different set of tools to 
secure a transparent state. Information technology, and developers that innovatively 
apply it, will better fix the state than legal rights enforced by state institutions and 
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the press or the transnational institutional watchdogs that pressure state institutions 
to conform to administrative and legal norms. More significantly, the classic legal 
approach views the rights and duties that open government laws create as acting 
neutrally upon the state, whose functions and operations would not necessarily 
change—though they would improve—due to the greater exposure and 
accountability that an enforceable right to know allows. The digital-transparency 
movement, by contrast, imagines a state that is defined by its data and the flow of 
information to and from it rather than by its actions, that is more immediately 
responsive to the public and allows extensive citizen participation and 
collaboration, and that provides a “platform” for government services and for the 
provision of public informational goods. The staunchest of the digital advocates 
appear ready to abandon the standard post-war model of the regulatory welfare 
state, with its overly paternalistic and invasive bureaucracy, and replace it with one 
that does little more than collect and enable the aggregation of data for public use 
and benefit or that operates as an open-source government through which citizens 
act directly with and upon officials to rule themselves. And whereas the FOI and 
NGO-based approaches envision a public that pays attention to the state and holds 
it accountable, digital-transparency advocates envision a thoroughly active public 
that is fully capable of engaging in effective popular democracy. Having subverted 
the intermediaries of the institutional press, having rendered an independent 
judiciary and transnational NGOs (themselves now networked with state actors and 
IFIs) largely unnecessary, and having shrunk the state and left it smaller and with a 
humbler role, digital transparency assumes in their place the emergence of a public 
that will act as wired “netizens” (and decidedly not mere couch potatoes). 
IV. THE VIGILANTE FIX: WIKILEAKS AND TRANSPARENCY 
Along with its offshoots and followers,184 WikiLeaks offers a distinct 
transparency agent: an organization and media outlet with the means to receive 
important digital files that shed light on government actions, distribute the files 
widely in electronic form, and protect its sources’ anonymity.185 After launching in 
                                                           
 
184 See infra note 193. 
185 The full WikiLeaks story is complex and still developing as this article is being written. For thorough 
and more fully sourced accounts, on which this section will depend, see Benkler, supra note 16; Mark 
Fenster, Disclosure’s Effects: WikiLeaks and Transparency, 97 IOWA L. REV. 753 (2012), available at 
http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/issues/ILR_97-3_Fenster.pdf. For additional background information, see 
generally DAVID LEIGH & LUKE HARDING, WIKILEAKS: INSIDE JULIAN ASSANGE’S WAR ON SECRECY 
(2011); GREG MITCHELL, THE AGE OF WIKILEAKS (2011); Alasdair Roberts, WikiLeaks: The Illusion of 
Transparency, 78 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 116 (2012); Molly Sauter, WikiLeaks FAQ, THE FUTURE OF 
THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT BLOG (Dec. 7, 2010), http://futureoftheinternet.org/wikileaks-
cable-faq; WikiLeaks, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WikiLeaks (last updated July 2011). In 
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2006 and enjoying some success in releasing documents that proved embarrassing 
to some governments,186 the site became most famous in the U.S. in 2010 when it 
began to release a massive cache of classified files that had been stolen from the 
Departments of Defense and State,187 allegedly by a serviceman whose security 
clearance and computer skills enabled him to download the materials from a 
military file server.188 Although none was classified above “secret,”189 the 
documents were unavailable to the public prior to their release by WikiLeaks.190 
Commentators have debated the extent of the documents’ significance and how 
much they have revealed, but there can be no question that WikiLeaks’s disclosures 
                                                                                                                                      
 
addition to government documents, WikiLeaks also receives and distributes documents purloined from 
private corporations, but I will focus here only on the government documents it has released. 
186 WikiLeaks’s early releases of documents included evidence of corruption in the Kenyan government; 
operation manuals of the Guantanamo Bay detention camp; secret manuals from the Church of 
Scientology; and documents that revealed self-dealing by the owners of Kaupthing Bank, the bank 
whose collapse hastened Iceland’s financial downfall. See LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 185, at 57–64; 
Manfred Goetzke, WikiLeaks Website Offers Promising Outlet for Fighting Corruption, DEUTSCHE 
WELLE (Nov. 26, 2009), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4930880,00.html. 
187 Benkler, supra note 16, at 321–30. 
188 MITCHELL, supra note 185, at 38–50; Alex Altman, Afghan Leaks: Is the U.S. Keeping Too Many 
Secrets?, TIME, July 30, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2007224,00.html; 
Ginger Thompson, Early Struggles of Soldier Charged in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2010, at A1. 
189 Most of the documents that composed the Afghanistan and Iraq “War Logs” were classified “secret.” 
Piecing Together the Reports, and Deciding What to Publish, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at A8, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/26editors-note.html; Scott Stewart, WikiLeaks 
and the Culture of Classification, STRATFOR GLOBAL INTEL. (Oct. 28, 2010), 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101027_wikileaks_and_culture_classification. Of the more than 
250,000 diplomatic cables WikiLeaks obtained, approximately 11,000 were classified “secret,” 4000 
were classified “secret” and “noforn” (that is, not to be shared with a foreign government), and 9000 
were classified “noforn.” Scott Shane & Andrew Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. 
Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/ 
world/29cables.html. See also What Do the Diplomatic Cables Really Tell Us?, DER SPIEGEL (Nov. 28, 
2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,731441,00.html (giving slightly different 
figures from those reported by The New York Times). 
190 See Daniel W. Drezner, Why WikiLeaks Is Bad for Scholars, CHRON. HIGHER ED., Dec. 5, 2010, 
http://chronicle.com/article/Why-WikiLeaks-Is-Bad-for/125628/ (characterizing diplomatic cables as 
documents that would have been unavailable to academics for decades); Dan Murphy, WikiLeaks 
Releases Video Depicting U.S. Forces Killing of Two Reuters Journalists in Iraq, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2010/0405/Wikileaks-
releases-video-depicting-US-forces-killing-of-two-Reuters-journalists-in-Iraq (noting that the Collateral 
Murder video showed an attack about which Reuters had unsuccessfully sought information through the 
Freedom of Information Act). 
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have at least marginally increased public knowledge about recent American 
military campaigns and the nation’s diplomatic relations with other countries.191 
The organization itself is small and somewhat anonymous (besides the 
celebrity status of its founder, Julian Assange), but it presents itself as a 
transnational NGO campaigning to change the political order and society. As its 
website declares, 
WikiLeaks is an independent global group of people with a long standing 
dedication to the idea of a free press and the improved transparency in society 
that comes from this. . . . 
The broader principles on which our work is based are the defence of freedom of 
speech and media publishing, the improvement of our common historical record 
and the support of the rights of all people to create new history. We derive these 
principles from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.192 
Embracing the conception of government information as a human right while 
exploiting information technology both to obtain and distribute classified 
documents, WikiLeaks combines elements of both the rights-based and digital-
transparency advocacy movements. 
A. Vigilante Transparency as Rights Protector and Enforcer 
WikiLeaks has played two significant roles as an advocate for transparency. 
First, by establishing its own powerful brand identity as a technologically 
sophisticated service capable of distributing purloined data anonymously, it has 
proven the viability of an anonymous, online leaking site as a model for others to 
follow. Numerous sites, both independent, non-profit ones and some proposed by 
established newspapers, have announced plans to do so.193 Second, its extralegal 
                                                           
 
191 See Fenster, supra note 185, at 790–807 (summarizing arguments made by WikiLeaks critics and 
proponents on the relative significance of the site’s disclosures, and attempting to discern their wider 
impact on the general public). 
192 About: What Is WikiLeaks?, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.org/About.html (last visited July 21, 2012). 
193 A disgruntled former WikiLeaks member, Daniel Domscheit-Berg, has launched another rival site, 
while The New York Times, WikiLeaks’s U.S. journalistic collaborator (with which it has a stormy 
relationship), may establish a competing site that would allow whistleblowers to anonymously pass 
documents to the newspaper. See Michael Calderone, NY Times Considers Creating an “EZ Pass Lane 
for Leakers,” YAHOO! NEWS BLOG (Jan. 25, 2010, 8:38 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/cutline/ny-
times-considers-creating-ez-pass-lane-leakers-20110125-053811-988.html; A Swarm of Leaks, 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 2010, at 72, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17674089?story_id= 
17674089; Frank Jordans, Openleaks, WikiLeaks Rival, Launches New Secret-Spilling Site, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28, 2011, 10:31 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/28/openleaks-
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(and possibly illegal) disclosure of illegally obtained government documents 
implicitly challenges government information security policies, a challenge that 
Assange has made explicit in his writings and interviews.194 Like digital and anti-
corruption transparency advocates, Assange has identified an information 
asymmetry and hoarding problem, a transparency fix, and a political objective: 
state secrecy can be defeated by whistleblowers and hackers who, through the 
medium of WikiLeaks, will leave in their wake a smaller, chastened, fully visible 
state. 
The issue WikiLeaks has confronted is the same that motivated the original 
FOI movement: state actors’ under-enforcement or blatant disregard of the public’s 
basic human right to view government information.195 The site describes its project 
in broad, world-historical terms: 
Article 19 [of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights] inspires the work of 
our journalists and other volunteers. It states that everyone has the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers. We agree, and we seek to uphold 
this and the other Articles of the Declaration.196 
WikiLeaks enforces this right, it claims, by disclosing facts—the raw documents 
that the state attempts to suppress. It does so through the “scientific journalism” it 
                                                                                                                                      
 
wikileaks-rival_0_n_815309.html. For accounts of other sites that have either adopted or adapted the 
WikiLeaks model, or that have announced plans to do so, see Benkler supra note 16, at 350; Fenster, 
supra note 184, at 759–60. 
194 See, e.g., About: What Is WikiLeaks?, supra note 192 (defining and defending “principled leaking” as 
a means to resist and challenge “secrecy laws [that] are being used to keep the public ignorant of gross 
dishonesty practised by their own government”); Bivol, 2011-05-01 Julian Assange: “I Believe in the 
Right to Communicate and the Inviolability of History,” WL CENTRAL (May 1, 2011), http:// 
wlcentral.org/node/1727 (quoting Assange interview with Bulgarian investigative journalism website in 
which he states, “Cablegate was not born from the citizen’s rights to access information: if this was the 
case Cablegate would have come from FOIA requests. Rather it was born from people who presumably 
worked for the US government feeling the information they saw showed wrongdoing that the public 
should know about.”). 
195 Hans Ulrich Obrist, In Conversation with Julian Assange, Part II, 26 E-FLUX J., June 2011, at 7, 
available at http://worker01.e-flux.com/pdf/article_238.pdf [hereinafter Obrist, Conversation II] 
(claiming that WikiLeaks can enforce the human right to know, the right to speak, and, above all, the 
right to communicate information). 
196 About: What Is WikiLeaks?, supra note 192. 
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claims to practice, which proves the truth of an objective news story by allowing 
readers “to click online to see the original document it is based on. That way you 
can judge for yourself: Is the story true? Did the journalist report it accurately?”197 
Although it shares with the legal-rights approach the claim that access to 
government information is so central to democracy that it must receive legal 
protection, the site has little faith in the state’s willingness to disclose its secrets 
and even to obey its own laws. Instead, WikiLeaks claims to advance popular 
democracy against despotic central authorities by obtaining and distributing the 
sovereign’s information: 
Today, with authoritarian governments in power in much of the world, 
increasing authoritarian tendencies in democratic governments, and increasing 
amounts of power vested in unaccountable corporations, the need for openness 
and transparency is greater than ever. WikiLeaks interest is the revelation of the 
truth [sic]. Unlike the covert activities of state intelligence agencies, as a media 
publisher WikiLeaks relies upon the power of overt fact to enable and empower 
citizens to bring feared and corrupt governments and corporations to justice.198 
The press interest groups and activists in the post-war period criticized state 
secrecy because they feared its use as a means to hide corrupt and potentially 
abusive government. They assumed that the state could serve as the institutional 
basis for reform. Working more than fifty years after the FOI movement began, 
WikiLeaks rejects political and legal reform in favor of active opposition to the 
state. 
For WikiLeaks, technology, unlike law, can trump the power and privilege of 
authoritarian governments and the authoritarian “tendencies” of putatively 
democratic states. “As a result of technical advances,” WikiLeaks declares, 
“particularly the internet and cryptography,” it can receive and distribute state 
secrets while it lowers if not eliminates risk to itself, its readers, and, most 
importantly, its sources.199 This looks superficially like a technological fix to 
secrecy akin to that proposed by the digital-transparency movement, and the site 
appears to share technologists’ utopian sentiments about a networked future. 
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2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/wikileaks/dont-shoot-messenger-for-revealing-
uncomfortable-truths/story-fn775xjq-1225967241332. 
198 About: What Is WikiLeaks?, supra note 192. 
199 Id. 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H  L A W  R E V I E W  
 
P A G E  |  4 9 6  |  V O L U M E  7 3  ( 2 0 1 2 )   
 
WikiLeaks does not share the technologists’ sunny view of social media and 
collaboration, however, and Assange himself appears as distrustful of the market 
and of corporate entities as he is of the state.200 He has explicitly expressed disdain 
for the very collaborative technological mechanisms that the digital-transparency 
advocates embrace—blogs, crowdsourcing, and the like—in the distribution of 
information.201 The site had at first depended on the blogosphere and online 
communities to publicize its releases and provide further investigation into their 
significance and context—a hope that proved unavailing.202 As a result, the site 
began to collaborate directly with major international newspapers for its 
Afghanistan, State Department, and Guantanamo releases, embracing precisely the 
old media whose predecessors sponsored the first wave of transparency advocacy 
and whose rapidly diminishing status as information gatekeeper the digital world 
was supposed to render obsolete.203 
In combining but also rejecting elements of the rights-based and digital 
approaches to transparency, while collaborating with mainstream newspapers and 
declaring its radical distrust of the state and other concentrated sources of power, 
WikiLeaks articulates and advocates a complex, conflicting conception of 
transparency. On the one hand, it seems to pursue the traditional goal of revealing 
the state to the public—not only to the citizens who can hold the state directly 
accountable but also to everyone who is able to “see evidence of the truth.”204 
“[O]ur sort of modus operandi behind our whole organization,” Assange has said, 
“is to get out suppressed information into the public, where the press and the public 
                                                           
 
200 Fenster, supra note 185, at 780. 
201 See Julian Assange, The Hidden Curse of Thomas Paine, GUERNICA, Apr. 29, 2008, http:// 
www.guernicamag.com/blog/571/the_hidden_curse_of_thomas_pai/; Aaron Bady, Julian Assange in 
Berkeley, ZUNGUZUNGU (Dec. 12, 2010, 5:53 PM), http://zunguzungu.wordpress.com/2010/12/12/ 
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visited July 22, 2012). 
203 See generally LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 185, at 110–15 (describing the negotiated agreements 
between WikiLeaks and its newspaper partners to redact documents); Benkler, supra note 16, at 323–24 
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and our nation’s politics can work on it to produce better outcomes.”205 All of the 
movements discussed above share this general assumption and ideal: more 
information leads to a more visible, functional, and authentically democratic state. 
And like the others, WikiLeaks can claim at least some success. Its recent military 
and diplomatic disclosures from the U.S. might only have marginally affected 
American politics and government policy,206 but the documents it has released have 
been distributed globally and seem to have affected countries discussed in the State 
Department cables.207 Viewed this way, WikiLeaks appears to offer an institutional 
mechanism for democratic reform, like the earlier transparency advocacy 
movements. 
But WikiLeaks also aspires to transform the state in more radical ways. Its 
critique of the state’s tendency towards secrecy, as well as Assange’s formative 
years in the “cypherpunk” community and his pre-2010 writings, bespeak a 
political program that views disclosure primarily as a means to discipline and limit 
the modern state’s authority over its subjects and its dealings with other nations.208 
One of Assange’s essays, posted online in the period just prior to WikiLeaks’ 
launch, sets forth his justification for and theory of deploying transparency as an 
almost revolutionary weapon against what he described as the pervasively 
autocratic, secretive nature of contemporary states.209 When faced with the threat 
                                                           
 
205 Julian Assange on WikiLeaks, War and Resisting Government Crackdown, DEMOCRACY NOW! 
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computer-conspiracy-“to-destroy-this-invisible-government”/; Fenster, supra note 185, at 774–82; Peter 
Ludlow, Rethinking Conspiracy: The Political Philosophy of Julian Assange, available at Brian Leiter, 
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that all of its internal correspondence will be leaked, a powerful, secretive regime 
will find itself unable to communicate with the agents it needs to oversee and 
instruct in order to operate. It must therefore either reform itself and act ethically—
in which case transparency has in fact performed its reformist function—or 
collapse. Transparency, then, serves not merely to improve the state but to pose a 
fundamental challenge to its operations.210 No such challenge can come from 
within the state itself. Laws attempting to impose transparency, which by definition 
are drafted and enforced by government institutions, will not offer the complete 
exposure that the right of access to information requires. Only a wholly 
independent institution, one willing to deploy extralegal tactics at the leading edge 
of technological innovation, can do so. Rather than viewing information technology 
as a means to reform the state’s administrative functions, WikiLeaks views its 
technological capabilities as a means to spur a collective political uprising that can 
refigure the state through popular democracy. 
B. The Limits of the Vigilante Fix 
Criticism of WikiLeaks as a model for transparency activism and as a 
proponent of a particular vision of transparency enforcement begins, typically, with 
the argument that it either engages in or solicits criminal activity.211 There is no 
question that it must rely on unauthorized and possibly illegal disclosures made by 
its sources. But with respect to WikiLeaks itself, the unauthorized, potentially 
criminal nature of these disclosures provokes one critique, one prediction, and one 
problem for the organization and those who follow its model: First, WikiLeaks’ 
actions constitute or rely upon lawless actions.212 Second, its disclosures will cause 
harm to American military, law enforcement, and diplomatic efforts.213 And third, 
its reliance on unauthorized, potentially illegal disclosures makes WikiLeaks 
vulnerable to supply chokeholds. I want to set aside the first issue to the extent that 
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it conjures up the complex legal issue of WikiLeaks’ criminal liability (which is 
beyond this article’s scope),214 and the adverse effects of its disclosures, which are 
to date arguably minimal and which the site itself claims to mitigate through its 
“harm minimization” efforts.215 Instead, I will focus on the problem that WikiLeaks 
faces in obtaining a sufficient supply of secrets, the site’s most significant 
vulnerability as a model to systematically force transparency upon states. 
WikiLeaks necessarily relies upon the existence of whistleblowers and 
hackers who are willing to release information against the state’s wishes and in 
violation of the law, a reliance that is neither particularly new nor a systematic 
means to make the state open. It thus confronts a problem that Daniel Ellsberg, as a 
Pentagon employee with security clearance and direct access to the documents he 
released, and with the single motivation of ending the Vietnam War, did not face 
after he leaked the Pentagon Papers—but would have faced had he promised to 
continue making unauthorized disclosures of classified documents from the 
American military as part of a broader effort to open all secret American 
government operations to public view. WikiLeaks’s business model, by contrast, 
depends upon the ongoing availability of content, while its political program as an 
agent of transparency depends upon the credible threat of an endless supply of 
leaked documents. Unlike the FOI, anti-corruption, and digital-transparency 
movements, all of which seek to petition and persuade the state to change its 
policies and practices, WikiLeaks operates in direct opposition to the state, whose 
laws it at best skirts and more often openly violates in order to enforce broader 
international human rights. Even the minimally non-transparent state cannot accede 
to WikiLeaks’ demands; it will inevitably attempt to control its information and 
stop leaks.216 If it successfully does so, then WikiLeaks and similar channels will 
lack supply from frustrated government employees or those who steal documents, 
and the model will fail while the state will remain opaque to its citizens. 
As a result, even if it can solve its ongoing financial and legal problems, and 
even if its model is successfully adopted by well-funded institutions, WikiLeaks 
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and its successors and copycats will always face a supply problem, one made more 
difficult when governments better secure their computer networks and security 
systems and harshly punish whistleblowers.217 It is possible, of course, that a 
thousand WikiLeaks will bloom, perhaps as small start-ups in response to new 
caches of documents, or that established newspapers or well-funded NGOs will be 
able to copy the WikiLeaks model and use it more regularly. But this scenario 
suggests something less than a permanent program to force transparency, especially 
in contrast to those advocated through law, technology, or international NGOs and 
IFIs, which propose permanent fixes to information asymmetry. Instead, it 
represents an irregular set of practices that can only be effective when sources 
make documents available. The risk that WikiLeaks and others will obtain and 
distribute documents over the Internet might affect official behavior, but it is 
unclear if those effects will either favor openness—for example, when state actors 
preemptively release documents or hold open meetings—or secrecy—for example, 
when officials do a more effective job of hiding their communication. The state 
will ultimately remain opaque except when WikiLeaks can crack it open—a 
dramatic but comparatively underwhelming ideal for making the state permanently 
and programmatically visible. 
C. Conclusion 
WikiLeaks rests its vision of a more functional and democratic state on the 
assumption that more disclosures will positively affect the state and public. Like 
FOI advocates, it views transparency as a human and political right; like anti-
corruption advocates, it views the state as inevitably corrupt without the monitoring 
that NGOs and other external institutions can provide; and like digital-transparency 
advocates, it views new technological developments as enabling a more visible, 
accountable state. But the site’s commitment to vigilante disclosures of government 
documents, as well as its radical political project and skepticism about the online 
community’s ability to process and distribute the information that it liberates, 
distinguish both its project and its vision of a truly transparent state. The state it 
hopes to call forth is neither the traditional one (as the FOI movement relies upon), 
nor the one overseen by networks of international NGOs that are in turn tied to 
networks of global capital (like the anti-corruption movement), nor a collaborative 
or minimal, market-oriented one (that digital advocates prefer), but a left-libertarian 
state that fully meets its international human rights obligations—obligations that 
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WikiLeaks will enforce, if no one else will—or will suffer the legal or 
revolutionary consequences. 
WikiLeaks’s most significant leaks to date have brought the site and its 
founder significant celebrity and may have played some supporting role in the 
political upheaval in Tunisia (which, in turn, may have had ripple effects in North 
Africa and the Middle East during the so-called Arab Spring). But the excessive 
legal and financial hurdles it has faced—surely predictable, given its open 
animosity to state institutions and laws—have hampered its operations and raised 
the anticipated costs of any who would follow in the site’s footsteps. And 
ultimately, WikiLeaks seems not to have had the kinds of effects that would 
support its boldest claims about its potential as an agent of transparency or about 
transparency’s potentially radical effects. As with digital-transparency advocates, 
WikiLeaks’s faith in its technological fix is belied by a post-technological political 
order that looks quite a bit like the one that preceded it. 
CONCLUSION: TRANSPARENCY IN SEARCH OF A FIX 
Since advocacy on transparency’s behalf began in earnest during the mid-
twentieth century, its various movements have proceeded from the same basic 
assumption about the problem that their efforts hope to solve—that states and state 
actors seek to protect the information they collect and produce from public 
disclosure. These movements also share a commitment to the idea that an external 
authority, whether legal, technological, or institutional, can provide the necessary 
fix. And as I have argued here, each movement is certain that its solution will, in 
turn, transform the state in a manner consistent with the movement’s political 
commitments and institutional interests.  
Nevertheless, they differ in the details of the fix they propose and the state 
they imagine. The FOI movement has long advocated new administrative laws and 
enhanced judicial review of administrative agencies, with the newly disclosed 
information reported on by an authoritative press—an institutional arrangement 
that was consistent with the existing state apparatus in the post-war U.S. The anti-
corruption movement advocates a transnational effort, led by NGOs and IFIs, to 
impose administrative and legal reforms that will lead to a non-corrupt state and a 
functional economy—one that is open to the flow of global investment. The digital-
transparency movement advocates the expanded use of information technologies to 
bring about a collaborative, open, smaller, and wired state, watched over by 
websites, netizens, and the wired public at large. WikiLeaks envisions unauthorized 
leaks as a means to protect and enforce human informational rights in a 
constrained, secretive state. 
The movements differ, too, in their relationships with the existing, flawed 
state they hope to change or even dismantle. Press advocates for a legal-rights 
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approach lobbied and collaborated with state actors, but in an effort to constrain the 
state in a process that included investigations and critiques of the government 
bureaucracy. Anti-corruption advocates collaborate with more powerful IFIs and 
with sympathetic state actors, but in an effort to fight what they view as state 
officials’ inevitable tendency towards corruption. Digital-transparency advocates 
collaborate with tech-savvy state actors regarding technical standards and data 
releases while critiquing state bureaucracy and, especially, its tendencies to hoard 
information and to refuse to collaborate and communicate with the public. And 
WikiLeaks views the state as an adversary whose foundations can and must be 
shaken by surreptitious and perhaps criminal efforts to steal its data. 
The newer transparency advocacy movements thus express, in different ways, 
dissatisfaction with the contemporary administrative state and with the laws 
intended to impose order and control over it. They envision a bounded, tamed state 
whose relationship to the public (and, for anti-corruption and digital-transparency 
advocates, the market) makes it more functional. The resulting state they envision 
may be smaller—indeed, perhaps it will no longer exist in its present form—but it 
will certainly operate more efficiently, more effectively, and, most importantly, in a 
more publicly accountable, more truly democratic manner. They thus work within 
and extend prevailing political, economic, and ideological shifts away from the 
post-war administrative state and towards one or more other ends: the globalization 
of capital, political sovereignty, and culture; the diffusion of digital technologies 
and networks; and a smaller, more modest role for the state in private markets and 
activities. Like the earlier FOI movement, they are political actors, deploying 
transparency to meet normative, prescriptive goals. There is, of course, nothing 
wrong with the political nature of transparency advocacy; advocates must persuade 
the public and petition government officials. But as I have tried to illustrate in this 
article, transparency is not a single or neutral administrative norm, despite efforts to 
advance it as such. Not only are its definition and limits contested, but advocates 
disagree over the best means to achieve it. Embedded within those disagreements 
are contested political ideas about the state. Not only does transparency require 
political advocacy, but it is, itself, a deeply political norm. 
Advocacy for transparency fixes has not to date resulted in the happy ending 
that advocates forecast. Notwithstanding the enactment of laws and recognition of 
public rights to require disclosure, parts of the state remain hidden; notwithstanding 
the best efforts of a wide array of NGOs to unveil and stop the state’s tendency 
towards corruption, the dream of a pure, honest government has been frustrated by 
the political nature of the state’s operations, the financial implications of official 
decision-making, and local bureaucratic resistance; notwithstanding information 
technology’s ability to move data from the state to public, government operations 
remain at a remove, while large swathes of the public appear unmoved by the 
digital magic; and notwithstanding the spectacular liberation of hundreds of 
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thousands of its secret documents, the American superpower has neither been 
overthrown by popular revolution nor faces internal collapse. The opacity that 
remains despite advocates’ best efforts—an opacity that indeed inhibits democracy 
and good governance—only demonstrates the necessity of advocates’ work. Their 
campaigns will continue to promote a variety of fixes, with varying degrees of 
success—all of them reflective of, and seeking to extend, a particular normative 
vision of a better, more perfectly visible state. 
